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New York State Club Association v. City of
New York: The Demise of the All-Male
Club
When some types of association are forbidden and others al-
lowed it is hard to tell in advance the difference between the
former and the latter. Being in doubt, some people steer clear of
them altogether and in some vague way public opinion tends to
consider any association whatsoever as a rash and almost illicit
enterprise.1
I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the Supreme Court
ruling in New York State Club Association v. City of New
York. 2 This case is the Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment regarding the constitutional right of association in private
clubs.3 Unfortunately, the effect of New York State Club Associ-
ation, is to further confuse an area of law whose parameters are
already ill-defined." The right of association, as an unenumer-
1. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 494 (G. Lawrence ed. 1966).
2. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
3. Other Supreme Court rulings regarding the right of association in a private club
setting include: Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
4. In 1987, the Court in Rotary conceded that while it "recognized that the freedom
to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental
liberty protected by the Bill of Rights[,] .... [the Court has] not attempted to mark the
precise boundaries of this type of constitutional protection." Rotary, 481 U.S. at 545.
Traditionally, membership policies of private organizations were not subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny. For example, when Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the law that serves as a model for virtually every state and local public accom-
modations statute, it questioned the constitutionality of legislation that would encroach
on the membership policies of private clubs and as a result, exempted private clubs from
the Act's application. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). During the Senate debates regarding the
private club exemption, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota stated: "We intend
only to protect the genuine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose mem-
bership is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis." 110 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964).
It was only until relatively recently, in the late 1970s and early 1980s that lobbying
and litigation efforts began to expand conventional understanding of which clubs quali-
fied as distinctly private under state and local public accommodations laws. These efforts
1
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ated and dependent right,5 is complex. It is a concept that owes
its existence to the judiciary, which often employs conflicting
and various means by which to determine the extent of that
right.' This Article will examine the current status of the right
of association after New York State Club Association, focusing
on the inherent tension between the personal liberty to choose
one's associates and the interest of the state to prevent discrimi-
nation of its citizens.7
New York State Club Association is but one in a recent tril-
ogy of decisions in which the Court has dealt with the conflict
between the first amendment rights of association and privacy
within organizations and the rights of individuals to be free from
the discriminatory membership policies employed by these orga-
nizations.8 The principal issue addressed in New York State
Club Association was whether an amendment to New York
City's Public Accommodations Law was constitutional.9
New York City's Public Accommodations Law bans discrim-
ination in places of public accommodation while specifically ex-
empting, in the interest of preserving the right of association,
received cautious approval by the Supreme Court: first in Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
(Court held that the Jaycees were not a distinctly private organization) and later, in
Rotary, 481 U.S. 537 (Court held that the Rotary Clubs do not fall within the private
club exemption under the California public accommodations law).
5. The right of association is not specifically stated in the U.S. Constitution, but the
Court has recognized the right of association as an essential freedom, necessary to pre-
serve the rights embodied in the first amendment and inextricably linked to the right of
privacy. See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text for a discussion on the right of
association.
6. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), a unanimous Court
clearly articulated a right of association.
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view . . . is undeniably
enhanced by group association .... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of ... the 'liberty' assured by the . . . Fourteenth
Amendment . . . [and] state action which may have the effect of curtailing that
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.
Id. at 460. However, by 1984, the Supreme Court, in Roberts, found that the right of
association was not "undeniable" as articulated in Patterson, but subject to several limi-
tations that may be justified by "state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas."
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
7. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
8. See also Rotary, discussed infra notes 117-47 and accompanying text; Roberts,
discussed infra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
9. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2231.
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those institutions which are "distinctly private."'" In 1986, the
Public Accommodations Law was amended for the purpose of
expanding the scope of the Law to private downtown men's
clubs.' 1 The amendment created a three-part test which effec-
tively placed a majority of these clubs within the ambit of the
statute, thus rendering them ineligible to defend their discrimi-
natory membership policy by claiming a right of association.'
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the statute as con-
stitutional, finding that the criteria applied in New York City's
three-part test was significant in defining the non-private nature
of an association.'" The Court found further that the Law did
not infringe upon a club member's right of expressive associa-
tion,'" was not overbroad,' 5 and did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause under the fourteenth amendment.'"
New York State Club Association v. City of New York
raises many questions. After the Court's ruling, what is the sta-
10. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
11. The basis for this amendment, known as Local Law 63, was the finding by the
New York City Council that the club members' interest or right to private association
does not outweigh the public interest in equal access and opportunity. The legislative
declaration that accompanied the amendment states in relevant part:
One barrier to the advancement of women ... in the business and professional life
of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain membership organizations
where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business
purposes, employment, and professional advancement are formed .... [Tihe com-
mercial nature of some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial im-
pact of these activities on business, professional and employment opportunities
cannot be ignored.
Joint Appendix at 15, New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836)
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].
12. The amendment states in part:
An institution, club or place of accommodation shall not be considered in its na-
ture distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides regular
meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities,
services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmem-
bers for the furtherance of trade or business. For the purpose of this section, a
corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the be-
nevolent orders law but formed under any other law of this state, or a religious
corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporation law
shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
13. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2229.
14. Id. at 2234.
15. Id. at 2235.
16. Id. at 2236-37.
1990]
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tus of the right of association? Which, if any, social spheres is
the Court prepared to recognize and protect in which a single
sex may exercise its own expression? How much legislative
structuring of private and individual choices is the Court pre-
pared to tolerate? These questions cannot be addressed without
establishing some historical and theoretical framework. As a re-
sult, Part II of this Article addresses the two fundamental con-
cepts which are in conflict in New York State Club Associa-
tion - the right of association versus the right of the state and
local governments to preserve equal opportunity and equal ac-
cess for all of their citizens. Part A addresses the nature of the
private men's club and the motivation behind legislation which
seeks to amend the rights of association. An examination of New
York City's Public Accommodations Law will be set forth in
Part B. The historical development of the constitutional right of
association and the likelihood that an all-male club can succeed
in claiming constitutional protection in the face of legislation
abridging this right is discussed in Part C.
Part III begins by an examination of the precursors to New
York State Club Association: Roberts v. United States
Jaycees17 and Board of Rotary Club International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte.8 This section concludes by setting out the facts,
procedural history, and Supreme Court opinion of New York
State Club Association v. City of New York. These three cases
form a trilogy that represents an attempt by the Court to define
the limits on the right of association and to address the ability
of the state and local government to limit individual choice to
further some collective need.
Part IV analyzes the effect of New York State Club Associ-
ation on the right of association, as well as its departure from
precedents laid out in Roberts and Rotary. New York State
Club Association is consistent with Roberts and Rotary in that
the Court has determined that the freedom of association ex-
tends only so far as the enumerated right of freedom of expres-
sion and the right to individual privacy. 9 But the Court does
17. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
18. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
19. See New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 545;
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
[Vol. 10:273
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more than merely give a "rubber stamp" affirmation to previous
case law. In New York State Club Association, the Court em-
barked on a new line of analysis in which the right of association
is dependent on whether an organization is deemed commercial
in nature.20 In Rotary and Roberts, the Court had employed
more flexible standards, which focused on the expressive rather
than the commercial nature of an organization and examined
whether the organization is private or public. 21
The outcome of New York State Club Association is lauda-
ble in that it affords women equal access to those clubs which
can be essential to professional growth.22 This author takes is-
sue, however, with the analysis employed by the Court. The end
result of New York State Club Association is a confusing mesh
of different standards leaving organizations with no clear guide-
lines for determining the extent of their associational right to
select members.
II. Background
A. The Effect of Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs
For the past two decades the American courts and legisla-
tures have recognized that discrimination of individuals is con-
trary to the best interest of society.23 To wit, exclusion of
women, like the exclusion of minorities, has a devastating social
effect - perpetuating outmoded and archaic sexual stereotypes
and stigmatizing women in the eyes of society2 4 Recognizing
20. Specifically, in order to define whether or not an organization is distinctly pri-
vate, Local Law 63 examines such criteria as whether the organization has restaurant
facilities, or whether the organization receives payment from nonmembers to further
commercial trade or business. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986), See infra
notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
21. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617. In both Rotary and Rob-
erts, the Court considered such factors as size, purpose, selectivity, interaction with
outside community, interaction of nonmembers with club activity, and the use of a dis-
criminatory membership policy to further the club's rights of expression.
22. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
23. For a brief history on the Court's recognition of gender as a basis for discrimina-
tion see generally, GINSBURG, The Burger Court's Grappling with Sex Discrimination, in
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625 (Discrimination "deprives persons of their
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of their wide participation in political,
economic, and cultural life."); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-
1990]
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that gender discrimination is a denial of equal protection," leg-
islatures have passed laws to ensure equal opportunity in educa-
tion and the workplace.2 6
However, despite their education and training, and despite
the fact that there are more women in the workplace than ever
before, when it comes to achieving the uppermost level posi-
tions,2" women may still operate at a disadvantage to their male
counterparts.28 This disadvantage stems from the summary ex-
clusion of women from membership in men's clubs, wholly on
the basis of their sex. 29 Evidence strongly suggests that these
26 (1982)(Discrimination perpetuates stereotypic notions and stigmatizes disfavored
groups as innately inferior.); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977)(Gender based
standards in Social Security Act reflected "archaic and overbroad" stereotypes about
roles and relative abilities of women.); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87
(1973)(plurality opinion) ("Statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect
of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard
to the actual capabilities of its individual members."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954)(holding that segregation of blacks and whites in education is "inherently
unequal").
25. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 197 (1976) (invalidating, as a violation of equal
protection, an Oklahoma law which permitted the sale of 3.2% beer to women at age 18
but to men at age 21); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating, as a
violation of due process and equal protection, a military service regulation which gave
automatic dependent status on a serviceman's wife but not a servicewoman's husband);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating, as a violation of equal protection, an
Idaho statute which preferred males to females as administrators of intestate estates).
26. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,920 (West 1980) which states: "It is recognized
that the practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminating in the terms of
employment ... deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for develop-
ment . . . and substantially and adversely affects the interest of employees, employers
and the public in general." See also the legislative declaration to Local Law 63 (enacted
to amend New York City's Public Accommodations Law) which states in relevant part:
"[Tihe city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citizens an environ-
ment where all persons ... have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the busi-
ness and professional life of the city, and may be unfettered in availing themselves of
employment opportunities." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
27. While women may be occupying more of the low to mid-level positions, a survey
of executives in the highest level positions revealed that only two-percent were women.
Hymowitz & Schellhardt, The Glass Ceiling, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1986, at 10 col. 1.
28. See Burns, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner
Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 321 (1983). In exam-
ining the effect of sex discrimination in private men's clubs, Professor Burns contends
that despite the equal access women have had to education and training, "[tiheir success
has been limited .... within the most lucrative and prestigious professions, by the recog-
nition of the truth of the adage that 'who you know is at least as important as what you
know.'" Id. at 322.
29. See, Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass'n in support of appellees at
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
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clubs can be essential to professional achievement.30 In fact, ap-
proximately one-third of all businessmen obtain their jobs
through personal contacts,3' and these clubs strive to create an
atmosphere that cultivates business deals and contacts.32
5, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836),
which states in relevant part:
The harm to the professional advancement of women .. caused by the exclusion
from this critical aspect of market place activity is ... widely recognized. Women
excluded by discriminatory policies are denied opportunities for contacts and pro-
fessional betterment available in "private" business clubs. These invidious effects
are exacerbated by the clear message to the larger community that the groups
excluded . . . are inherently inferior or are not entitled to equal professional
opportunities.
See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Minnesota Chapter, Nat'l Org. for Women at 21-22,
United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981)(No. 51171), which de-
scribes the important role private clubs play in boosting a man's career: "It provides men
with knowledgable allies who help them to advance in their careers, to quickly learn who
the cast of characters is and how to behave in a new position, and to get the earliest news
of job openings, business opportunities and grants to be awarded." Id.
30. Examples of opportunities lost by women as a result of being banned from these
clubs include the following: The New York Director of the Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith was barred from a White House briefing taking place in an all-male club.
See Brief for Appellee at 5, New York State Club Ass'n, v. City of New York 108 S. Ct.
2225 (No. 86-1836) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. An Executive Director of the New
York chapter of the Democratic National Committee could not attend a meeting of the
New York Public Affairs Professionals held at the all-male Union League Club. Id.
Women have been barred from industrial meetings and training seminars held at all-
male clubs by Wall Street professionals. Id. at 6 (citing Schafran, Private Clubs, Women
Need Not Apply, Foundation News, Jan.-Feb. 1982).
In addition, the president of a New York securities firm testified to the New York
City Council that he used the club "solely for business meetings." Id. at 7. The Chair-
man of the Conference of Private Organizations admitted during his testimony that his
business is carried out at these clubs. Id. at 5. In addition, Andrew Stein, City Council
President, testified that "business is transacted over lunch in the clubhouse dining room.
Contacts and deals are made in the relative quiet of the clubhouse bar." Id.
31. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 4, which states in relevant part: "The
Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that almost one-third of males get their jobs through
personal contacts and that this figure is almost certainly higher for high-level jobs." For
a general discussion on the continued importance of job contacts in employment, see JOB
SEEKING METHODS USED BY AMERICAN WORKERS, BULL. No. 1886, TABLE III, U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR (1972).
32. Rhode, Private Clubs and Public Values, 22 STAN. L. REV. 15, 15-16 (1987). It is
clear that a principal reason for these clubs' existence is the amount of commercial activ-
ity that occurs within the confines of the clubs. It is not uncommon for business deals
and political opportunities to occur within the confines of all-male clubs. For example,
Nixon's change in his presidential strategy came about after a discussion with fellow club
member Ronald Reagan at the prestigious Bohemian Club in San Francisco. G. WILL,
NIXON AGNOSTIES 256 (1970). Sociologist G. William Domhoff has instituted several stud-
ies which catalogue the relationship between club memberships, private school attend-
1990]
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B. Public Accommodations Statutes
An examination of public accommodations statutes is signif-
icant because this legislative device reaches into the private sec-
tor, thus accomplishing for the people what the fourteenth
amendment and the due process clause cannot.3 3 Thirty-three
ance and corporate directorships. G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES (1970). In one of his
books, Domhoff published a study of the 20 largest industrial corporations in America.
This study shows that "at least one director from 12 of the top 20 companies was a
member of the Links Club," a prominent male club in New York. Similarly, at the Cen-
tury Club in New York, eight of the top 20 companies were represented. G. DOMHOFF,
WHO RULES AMERICA? 26 & n.41 (1970). For a more detailed discussion on business and
political deals which have been conceived and negotiated in all-male clubs, see generally
Burns, supra note 28, at 329-43.
33. An inherent limitation of the fourteenth amendment is that by its own terms,
"[no] state shall ... deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws[,]" it is
limited to acts of states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Recognizing this
limitation, the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), invalidated
Congressional legislation designed to ban discrimination in privately owned public
accommodations.
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the seemingly private activity is
colored by governmental involvement. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556
(1974) (city policy of granting temporary but exclusive use and control of city recreation
facilities to private segregated schools perpetuated a dual school system and was consti-
tutionally impermissible); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(leasing of space within a state-funded parking facility to a privately owned restaurant
that refused to serve blacks held to be state action); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88
(1932) (Since the state delegated power to the private political party executive commit-
tees, they are "organs of the State itself, the repositories of official power."). But see
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (granting of a state liquor license to a
discriminatory private club not state action).
State involvement may not be a viable line of argument for a plaintiff because case
law indicates that it is difficult to prove. For example, the Supreme Court tends to con-
sider each component of governmental involvement separately. See Jackson v. Metropol-
itan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), a case concerning the activity of a privately owned
electric utility and the application of the due process clause to its practice of terminating
services of its customers. The Supreme Court, in refusing to look at all the factors in the
aggregate, found no state action. Id. In cases involving private sex discrimination, the
Court's failure to look at the whole picture of governmental involvement invariably leads
to the conclusion that the discriminatory practices do not involve, to any significant de-
gree, state action. See Burns, supra note 28, at 357.
After establishing state involvement, plaintiffs alleging racial or ethnic discrimina-
tion have been largely successful because they have been regarded by the Court as a
suspect class to which the Court has applied a "strict scrutiny" standard. See e.g., Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and subject to the most rigid strict
scrutiny). Under strict scrutiny, a compelling state interest must be shown in order to
justify the suspect classification. Id. at 216 ("Pressing public necessity may sometimes
justify the existence of [race specific] restrictions; racial antagonism never can.").
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
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states and the District of Columbia have enacted public accom-
modations statutes which prohibit sex discrimination.
3 4 Most of
these statutes were amended to include gender as a basis of dis-
crimination in the 1970s, arising from the impact of the women's
rights movement.3 5 Unfortunately, twenty-two of these public
accommodations statutes provide an exemption for private
clubs.3 6
Despite their limitations, properly amended private accom-
modations statutes have enormous potential for fighting gender
discrimination.37 For example, the use of public accommodations
statutes to fight racial discrimination in private clubs has been
The plaintiff wishing to prove sex discrimination will be disappointed to find that
the Supreme Court has developed a lesser standard of review for cases involving sex
discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) ("the perception of racial
classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy tragic history that gender-based
classifications do not share."). To date, the Court has not recognized women as a suspect
class for the purpose of fourteenth amendment analysis and instead applies a standard
which the Court has penned "a middle standard of review." Id. at 197 ("To withstand
constitutional challenge .... classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
Because the Court engages in a seriatim analysis in determining state involvement,
and because a lesser standard of review is applied by the Court when state action is
found, it is evident that combatting sex discrimination in a private club based upon a
fourteenth amendment/state action argument may have limited success.
34. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (1986); CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1982);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501(2) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503 (1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7301 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2(A) (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
601A.7(1)(a) (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 4592 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2303 (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp.
1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-134 (1987); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 354A:8-IV (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-4 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 4-33-7 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Page Supp.
1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-23 (Supp. 1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(f)(1) (Supp. 1977); Wis.
STAT. § 942.04(a) (1975). See generally Special Project, Discrimination in Access to Pub-
lic Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978) [hereinafter Project].
35. See Project, supra note 34, at 264.
36. See id. at 250 n.251.
37. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1986) (use of California's public accommodations statute to assert the right to allow
women into a California Rotary Club, despite the all-male membership policy of Rotary
Club International); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (use of Min-
nesota's public accommodations statute to fight the all-male membership policy of the
United States Jaycees).
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most effective.3 8 These statutes are a double-edged sword, how-
ever. They preserve for the public equal access and opportunity,
while placing limits on an individual's right of association.
1. New York City's Public Accommodations Law
Prior to its amendment in 1984, New York City's Public Ac-
commodations Law prohibited discrimination in places of public
accommodation but, like the state and federal public accommo-
dations statutes it was modeled after, broadly excluded from its
coverage places deemed "distinctly private."3 9 This exemption
allowed private clubs to continue to exclude women from their
membership even though a substantial amount of the clubs' ac-
tivities were business, not socially, related.4"
On October 24, 1984, the New York City Council passed Lo-
cal Law 63, thereby amending the Public Accommodations Law
by providing specific criteria for determining whether a place of
accommodation is "distinctly private."' In enacting Local Law
63, the City Council was trying to find a balance between pro-
viding equal access to professional opportunities for all its citi-
zens and the associational rights of the club members.2 As a re-
38. Using a fourteenth amendment/equal protection argument, the plaintiff in
Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972), sought injunctive relief requiring the
Pennsylvania liquor board to revoke a private club's liquor license after he was refused
restaurant service on the basis of his race. Id. at 164-65. The Supreme Court held that
the state's granting of a liquor license was not sufficient to implicate the state in the
discriminatory policies of tho club and was not "state action" within the meaning of the
equal protection clause. Id. at 175-76.
Later, however, a different suit was brought against the same lodge, this time under
Pennsylvania's public accommodations law. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n
v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 229 A.2d 594 (1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1052. Using the Pennsylvania's public accommodations statute as a ba-
sis for its decision, the state court was able to effect what it could not effect under the
state action/fourteenth amendment theory. To wit, the lodge was found to be subject to
Pennsylvania's public accommodations law and was banned from exercising its discrimi-
natory policies. Id.
39. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
40. Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 2.
41. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). See supra note 12 for amend-
ment's relevant text.
42. See Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 16. In its legislative declaration to Local
Law 63, the Council states that it is not the "Council's purpose to interfere in club activ-
ities or subject club operation to scrutiny beyond what is necessary in good faith to en-
force the [public accommodations law]." Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
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sult, the amendment was designed not to cover all private clubs,
but only those clubs which satisfy the criteria set forth in the
amendment. 3
These criteria are outlined in a three-part test. Before a
club can come within the scope of the Public Accommodations
Law, it must satisfy all three criteria." ' First, the organization
must have over 400 members."5 Next, the organization must pro-
vide regular meal service."1 Finally, the organization must be in
the habit of receiving, directly or indirectly, payment for dues,
fees, space, meals, or other club business, from outside nonmem-
bers for the furtherance of trade or business.47
Local Law 63 was passed after years of hearings and investi-
gations which focused on the business activities prevalent in
these clubs and the prejudicial effect on women of an all-male
membership policy.'8 Testimony offered during these hearings
documented several instances where important business events
43. In its legislative declaration to Local Law 63, the New York City Council states:
[It] is not the Council's purpose to dictate the manner in which certain private
clubs conduct their activities or select their members, except insofar as is neces-
sary to ensure that clubs do not automatically exclude persons from consideration
for membership or enjoyment of club accommodations and facilities and the ad-
vantages and privileges of membership, on account of invidious discrimination.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
44. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
45. Id. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 9. The Council chose the number
400 after the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984). The Roberts decision characterized two local chapters of the Jaycees, one with
400 and the other with 430 members, as "large" and undeserving of a right of private
association. Id. at 621.
46. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). The Council chose this criteria
after making a finding, "that business activity often occurs at clubs ... which provide
regular meal service allowing persons to discuss business." Joint Appendix, supra note
11, at 15.
47. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). This criteria was based on the
City Council's finding that because club membership can be important to develop an
employer's business, employers are frequently in the habit of paying for their employee's
club membership dues. In addition, the Council found that employers are frequently in
the habit of renting out club facility space for business meetings which are attended by
nonmembers. Because these organizations provide substantial benefits to nonmembers
and businesses, they are not "distinctly private." Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 15.
48. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 3. For a detailed report on the testi-
mony heard, including who testified, and excerpts of the testimony, see Lynton, Behind
Closed Doors: Discrimination by Private Clubs: A Report Based on City Commission on
Human Rights Hearings 3 (May 1975); Hearings Before the Committee on General Wel-
fare, New York City Council, December 22, 1983 [hereinafter Hearings].
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have been held at private men's clubs;"9 where women have been
excluded from these events solely because of their sex;5 ° as well
as the "awkward and humiliating" treatment women have exper-
ienced when they have been allowed entrance to the club as
guests. 1
Based on the extensive testimony and materials before it,
the Council determined that because of the commercial activi-
ties occurring within, club membership can be an important
"catalyst" in an individual's professional career, and that the de-
nial of membership to women can have a prejudicial impact on
these women's careers.2 Despite the fact that many benevolent
49. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 15. In the legislative declaration, the Council
states that part of the "business activity" prevalent in the clubs addressed by Local Law
63 is the holding of business meetings in the club's conference rooms. Id. "The organiza-
tions also rent their facilities through members for use as conference rooms for business
meetings attended by non-members." Id. In legislative hearings before the Committee on
General Welfare, a division of the New York City Council, a president of a New York
securities firm stated that he used the club "almost solely for business meetings." Brief
for Appellee, supra note 30, at 7 (quoting Hearings, supra note 48, at 2 (written testi-
mony of Martin Whitman)). In addition, the Vice Chancellor of the City University of
New York and the City's chief lobbyist, was unable to attend an important business
meeting at an Albany men's club. Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 6 (quoting Hear-
ings, supra note 48, at 8 (oral testimony)). "Women have been barred from industry
meetings and excluded from training programs held at these clubs by Wall Street profes-
sionals." Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 6 (citing Schafran, Private Clubs, Women
Need Not Apply, Foundation News (Jan/Feb. 1982)). "When a woman member of the
executive committee of the Republican Party Caucus objected to its meetings at the all-
male Century Association, 'she was given the choice of shutting up or dropping out.' "Id.
(quoting Hearings, supra note 48, at 4 (written testimony of Lynn Hecht Schafran)). "
As Cyril Brickfield, then-President of the National Club Association concluded in 1973,
'[i]t is sometimes vital to belong [to a club] to become an executive. To the extent you
are excluded, you are disadvantaged.'" Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 48, at 2 (writ-
ten testimony of Isaiah Robinson, Jr., Chairman, New York City Commission on Human
Rights)).
50. The legislative declaration which accompanied Local Law 63 notes that the ex-
clusionary policies of all-male-clubs creates a "barrier to the advancement of women . . .
in the business and professional life of the city." Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 15.
51. Humiliating treatment of women has included: being forced to use a service en-
trance, back stairwells, and service elevators; being directed not to sit in the lobby; and
being required to use separate dining facilities (while the business discussion continues
over lunch in the main dining room). See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 6. See also
Burns, supra note 28, at 333 n.36 (quoting L. Schafran, supra note 49, at 2-3).
52. The Council, in their legislative declaration, found that although some of these
clubs may be organized for social or educational purposes, "the commercial nature of
some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial impact of these activities on
business, professional and employment opportunities of... women cannot be ignored."
Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 15.
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and religious organizations5" meet the three-part requirement
outlined in Local Law 63, the Council specifically exempted
these organizations from the statute since they were not "places
where business activity is prevalent.
54
C. The Right of Association as a Means to Discriminate
Proponents of all-male private clubs defend their admis-
sions criteria by relying on the constitutional rights of associa-
tion and privacy.5 The right of association, however, is not a
right that is specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Never-
theless it has been frequently invoked by the Supreme Court
over the last thirty years56 and has been traditionally linked to
the first amendment rights of speech, petition, and assembly.57
In the past few decades the Court has expanded the scope of the
right of association into a right that may be exercised beyond
53. Specifically, the amendment exempted corporations "incorporated under the be-
nevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under any
other law of this state, or a religious corporation incorporated under the education law or
the religious corporations law .... " NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
54. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 15; Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 1.
55. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) ("Our decisions establish
with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate ... is protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
("The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.");
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("Compelled disclosure of
affiliation with groups .. .may constitute .. . a restraint on freedom of association.").
56. See generally City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989); Eu v. San Fran-
cisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989); Reed v. United Transp.
Union, 109 S. Ct. 621 (1989); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct.
2225 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Club Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
208 (1987); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Citizens Against Rent Control/
Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 107 (1981); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Nixon v. Adminstrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 347
(1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974); Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974); U.S. v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 347 U.S. 449 (1958).
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1975) (recognition by the Court that the right of
political association is protected under the first amendment as a necessary component of
political expression); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973) (first and fourteenth
amendments guarantee the "freedom to associate with others for the common advance-
ment of political beliefs and ideas"). See also Raggi, The Independent Right to Freedom
of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1977). Professor Raggi asserts that: " 'free-
dom of association' has been little more than a shorthand phrase used by the Court to
protect traditional first amendment rights of speech and petition as exercised by individ-
uals in groups." Id. at 1.
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individual interests in first and fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees.58 For example, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,9
58. In the 1960s and 1970s, some commentators speculated that the Court was be-
ginning to recognize the notion that freedom of association was not strictly linked to
enumerated first amendment rights and that the Court was ready to recognize the free-
dom of association as an independent right. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (expressly rejects any attempt to narrow the first amend-
ment right of petition to political expression); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (First amendment rights of petition and
assembly include the right to assemble to consult with others regarding the best means
to exercise those rights.); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (expressly rejects a
"literal conception of freedom of speech, petition, or assembly" and instead invoked the
freedom of association). See generally Raggi, supra note 57, at 2 (The purpose of this
article was to consider the potential for an independent right of association, to determine
what role an independent right could play in American society, and to formulate analysis
and theory for the Court to utilize in creating this right.).
In Button, the Court alluded in dicta that freedom of association is an implied first
amendment right, analytically separate from the enumerated first amendment rights.
The Court rejected the notion that it should be bound by a narrow or literal reading of
the constitutional rights and that both the first and fourteenth amendments protected
"certain forms of orderly group activity." Button, 371 U.S. at 430.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was the first declaration by the Court
that although the right of association owed its existence to the first amendment, its scope
can be expanded and remain intact without any related first amendment rights of
speech, petition, or assembly. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court suggested that free-
dom of association includes the opportunity to enjoy the society of other people, and
that this right exists despite the absence of any express exercise of enumerated first
amendment rights. Id. at 484. "Marriage is... an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes .... Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions." Id. at 486. In his closing dicta, Justice Douglas suggests that, although the
right of association is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, it is a "penumbra
of the First Amendment" and stands independently of the rights enumerated in the firist
amendment. Id. at 484.
During his years on the bench, Justice Douglas alluded to the independent right of
association in several opinions. For example, in his concurring opinion in United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), Justice Douglas clearly stated that the
choice of one's associates is fundamental to the Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion; that the act of associating itself is entitled to Constitutional protection and that the
right of association is "deep in our tradition." Id. at 536-38. Moreno involved a challenge
to the 1965 Food Stamp Act which denied food stamps to households which contained
unrelated individuals. The majority struck down the law as a violation of equal protec-
tion since the regulation was not rationally related to the purpose of the Act, to feed the
poor. Id.
In Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), Justice Doug-
las argued that the act of "[jloining is one method of expression." Id. at 882. Thus,
Douglas might argue that all-male clubs make a statement that they do not wish to asso-
ciate with women, and that this expression, no matter how unpopular, is worthy of pro-
tection, as is the form that the expression takes.
Finally, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION
the Court affirmatively recognized that the freedom of associa-
tion applies not only to the individual within the group, but to
the group itself.
Since NAACP, the Court has recognized at least two catego-
ries of associational rights.6 0 First, there exists a private or inti-
mate right of association that is connected with the fundamental
right of privacy." The right of personal association is most often
identified with "personal affiliations" that are necessary to "at-
tend [to] the creation and maintenance of a family.""2
It is difficult to envision a non-benevolent or non-religious
organization that could successfully claim a right of intimate as-
sociation. The values protected by the right of intimate associa-
tion - marriage, child rearing, and physical intimacy - are
rarely found and embraced beyond familial relationships. Al-
though intimate relationships can be formed between individual
members of an organization, the protection of that friendship is
unlikely to extend to the protection of the organization in which
on other grounds), Justice Douglas, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, reasoned
that the right of association could be used to discriminte against others. Id. at 179-80. In
essence, Justices Douglas and Marshall reasoned that under the right of association, the
government could not regulate membership policies of associations which expressly ex-
cluded individuals on the basis of race, creed or color. Id.
59. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[elffective advocacy of ... [speech] is undeniably
enhanced by group association").
60. There may also exist a third category, the right of economic association. This
right has been linked with the right to join together in labor unions and trade associa-
tions. However, in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945), the Court upheld a
state law which prohibited a labor association from denying persons membership because
of their race. Although the association argued that the ability to control one's economic
associations was a fundamental liberty protected by due process, the Court refused to
invalidate the statute, so long as the legislation was rationally promoting a legitimate
goal by restricting the business association's activities. Id. at 93-94.
61. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
545 (1987) ("Freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships
is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights."); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (Bill of Rights was designed to preserve individ-
ual liberties and the "formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal
relationships" should be secured from unjustified state interference); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977) (choice of relatives to live together cannot be
lightly denied by the State).
62. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86
(1978) (Wisconsin statute barring divorced males paying child support from marrying
without court approval was unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (regulations imposing a burden on a decision as to whether to
bear children can be justified only by compelling state interests).
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the friendship was formed.6
A second recognized right of association is expressive associ-
ation, or, the right to associate in order to engage in activities
specifically enumerated in the first amendment. 4 This right is
implied in the first amendment's guarantees of free speech65 and
is protected under strict scrutiny." The right of expressive asso-
ciation, therefore, cannot be curtailed unless the government
regulation is narrowly tailored to promote an end not associated
with first amendment rights and is no more restrictive than
necessary.6 7
Courts have found that the need for expressive association
is fundamental in a free society. 8 In a country as geographically
and culturally diverse as the United States, the formation of as-
sociations in which to advance expression is worthy of constitu-
63. It is unlikely that even the smallest organization can claim a right of intimate
association when, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court was
unwilling to apply associational rights to students living in the same household. See also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 156 (1986) (Court upheld state laws prohibiting sodomy,
thus denying two unmarried adults the right to claim intimate association within their
own home).
64. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (right to engage in first amendment activities im-
plies the right "to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 233 (1977) ("The freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of ad-
vancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments."); United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (associational activity
designed to obtain access to courts protected under first amendment); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (state, in exercising its interest to
protect the public, cannot work a significant impairment on associational freedoms).
65. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (Implicit in the right to engage in first amendment
activities is a right to associate with others in pursuit of those activities.).
66. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (Govern-
mental action which has the effect of curtailing associational freedoms is subject to strict
scrutiny.).
67. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. See also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1975) (Even a state's significant interference with associational rights may
be upheld as constitutional if the state can demonstrate a "sufficiently important inter-
est and employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms.").
68. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1929) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(Justice Brandeis warns that the founding fathers knew that "the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies."). See
also, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("According protection to collective effort on behalf of
shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.").
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tional protection. 9 To limit the right of expression to the indi-
vidual would not advance the purposes of the first amendment
as envisioned by the Framers and would be contrary to a demo-
cratic society. 0
The problem that all-male clubs have in advancing an ex-
pressive right of association, however, is that the modern Court
has refused to recognize the freedoms of speech and expression
as absolutes.7 1 While some of the clubs'-activities may in fact be
expressive, this can be said for virtually all group activity. The
first amendment was never meant to protect every expressive as-
pect of man's activity.72 Thus, in order to prevail in a freedom of
expressive association claim, the discriminating club must show
more than the fact that new members, with new attitudes and
viewpoints, may affect the views of the association as a whole.73
An association should instead be prepared to show that its ex-
pression is actually advanced by the exclusion of certain groups.
For example, an association that is formed to advance the views
of misogynists or male supremacists, could argue that the exclu-
69. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 233 ("Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity
that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and
ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
70. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(Justice Holmes states his "market place of ideas" theory. The first amendment prohib-
its governmental suppression of ideas because the validity of any idea can only be tested
by airing it in the public forum.).
71. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (refusing to recognize the right of expressive associ-
ation as absolute); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (Justice
Harlan, writing for the Court, rejected the notion that the freedoms of speech and as-
sembly were absolute. The "constitutionally protected freedom of speech ... [is not] an
unlimited license to talk.").
72. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 654 (1984)
(In this often quoted article, Professor Karst contends that the first amendment is not a
"generalized presumptive guarantee of the liberty to do anything that has expressive
aspects .... " Adherence to such a doctrine would result in the "First Amendment...
stretched to cover all constitutional freedoms.").
73. This is the kind of argument set forth by the Jaycees in Brief for Appellee at 20-
21, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724). The Jaycees,
pointing to empirical data which showed women less likely to support conservative polit-
ical candidates, argued that admitting women members might have the effect of diluting
their support of President Reagan; or might lead to the organization adopting stances on
the ERA or abortion, subjects which it had not addressed in the past. Id. The Court
rejected this argument holding that there was no evidence in the record to show that
admitting women would put serious burdens on the male members' ability to continue to
exercise their freedom of expression. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
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sion of women affirmatively advances its expressive position.
III. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, and New York
State Club Association v. City of New York
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
Roberts v. United States Jaycees addressed the "conflict
between a State's efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimina-
tion against its citizens" '74 through the enforcement of a state
public accommodations statute, and the "constitutional freedom
of association asserted by members of a private organization.
'7 5
The Court rejected the Jaycees' constitutional claims and estab-
lished a framework for analyzing future claims of associational
freedom. 76 The framework established by the Court, however,
was not the most significant or far reaching aspect of the case.
Before Roberts, many clubs, groups, and associations embraced
a notion of associational rights in which "[g]overnment may not
tell a man or a woman who his or her associates must be. The
individual can be as selective as he desires. '77 The Roberts
Court helped to dispel this notion by rejecting the Jaycees' con-
stitutional claims to a right of associational freedom.78 The crite-
ria the Court established to determine when a constitutionally
protected right of association may exist, however, was subjective
and, at best, an easily manipulatable precedent. 79 The Roberts
74. Id. at 612.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 612-29.
77. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (quoting Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Though associa-
tional rights were never as far reaching as Gilmore suggests, or as private organizations
embraced; the quote is illustrative of an attitude shared by many Americans and Ameri-
can associations.
78. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29. Although the Court did not reject the notion of an
independent right of association, the Court concluded that the Jaycees were quasi-public
and could not invoke such an associational privilege. Id. at 621.
79. While the Roberts Court alluded to the parameters of the right of association as
if they were clearly defined, it failed to articulate any concrete rules of law for future
courts to follow. The confusion of Roberts is exemplified by the fact that Local Law 63,
the anti-discrimination amendment to New York City's Public Accommodations statute
at issue in New York State Club Ass'n, fails to employ many of the criteria employed by
[Vol. 10:273
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case arose in 1974 and 1975 when two chapters of the Minnesota
Jaycees amended their national bylaws to admit women as regu-
lar members.8 0 In December of 1978, the national organization
informed the Minnesota chapters that a motion to revoke the
chapters' charters was under consideration.8 1 The two chapters
responded by filing charges of sex discrimination with the Min-
nesota Department of Human Rights."
The complaint alleged that the Jaycees' national all-male
membership policy violated Minnesota's Human Rights Act."
The Commissioner of Human Rights investigated and found
probable cause to believe that the imposition of sanctions
against the two chapters by the national organization violated
Minnesota's Human Rights Act and ordered an evidentiary
the Roberts Court in determining the applicability of anti-discrimination statutes to pri-
vate organizations. Yet the Supreme Court upheld Local Law 63's departure from the
Roberts criteria; finding that the standards employed by Local Law 63 were "as signifi-
cant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations" as the criteria applied in
Roberts. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988).
The confusion over the significance of Roberts is best exemplified in the following jour-
nal article published shortly after the Roberts decision.
The inconsistencies and ambiguities in U.S. Jaycees may in one sense serve the
Court well. The Court has kept its options open. Should it choose to do so, U.S.
Jaycees could be extended to uphold the application of anti-discrimination stat-
utes to organizations as diverse as the Rotary International .... More probably,
language in the opinion will be used by courts to limit application of anti-discrimi-
nation statutes to a handful of organizations which employ the Jaycees' unusually
aggressive recruitment policies .... The Jaycees is not primarily a social group, its
membership policies are very unselective, and expressive activity is of relatively
minor importance to the organization. A future case where any of those three fac-
tors is not present would be a different case with a very good likelihood of produc-
ing a different result.
Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1878, 1900-01 (1984). The irony of Professor Linder's observations is that the clubs in
New York State Club Ass'n possessed the three factors alluded to in his article: social
setting, selectivity, and expressive activity. These factors did not produce a "different
result," as Linder predicted, but the same result as Roberts, despite the conflicting crite-
ria employed by the Court in each case. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
80. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, subd. 3 (Supp. 1988), which states: "It is unfair dis-
criminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public ac-
commodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex."
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hearing.84 A hearing before the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization was
a "place of public accommodation '85 and that the exclusion of
women as regular members was an "unfair discriminatory prac-
tice. '8' The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with this finding
and held that the Jaycees' organization was a place of public ac-
commodation and fell within the scope of the Human Rights
Act.8 7
The national organization responded by filing a complaint
against various Minnesota officials in the United States District
Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent en-
forcement of the Act.88 The district court made findings consis-
tent with the state hearings and held in favor of the state
officials.89
The district court's opinion was overturned, however, by a
divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.90 The court of
appeals found that application of the Act to the Jaycees would
be a "direct and substantial" interference with the organiza-
tion's right to select its members as guaranteed by the first
amendment,9 1 and that the state's interest in eliminating dis-
crimination was not sufficiently compelling to outweigh this in-
terference. 2 The court of appeals further reasoned that Minne-
sota's failure to provide any criteria distinguishing "private"
organizations from "public accommodations" rendered the Act
84. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
85. Id. According to Minnesota's Human Rights Law, a "place of public accommo-
dation" is defined as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recrea-
tion, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or
otherwise made available to the public. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01, subd. 18 (West Supp.
1990).
86. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-16 (citing Minnesota v. United States Jaycees, No. HR-
79-014-GB (Minn. Office of Hearing Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, Oct. 9,
1979)).
87. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
88. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982), rev'd, 709
F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
89. McClure, 534 F. Supp. at 774.
90. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
91. Id. at 1570.
92. Id. at 1571-72.
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unconstitutionally vague."
In 1984, the Roberts case was argued in front of the Su-
preme Court. 4 The essential conflict in that case was the same
conflict the Court would confront in Board of Directors of Ro-
tary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte and again in New
York State Club Association v. City of New York - the state
interest in preventing sex discrimination contrasted against the
right of association. 5
The seven Justices who decided this case 96 unanimously
agreed that the state had the ability to restrict this right of asso-
ciation, but differed in determining what methodology to apply
to the decision. On the one hand, Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, applied a two-part balancing test and concluded
that the state's interest in eliminating discrimination out-
weighed any rights of association claimed by the Jaycees.98 On
the other hand, Justice O'Connor disagreed in part with the ma-
jority's analysis, finding it both "overprotective of activities un-
deserving of constitutional shelter [commercial organizations]
and underprotective of important First Amendment concerns
[expressive organizations].""
93. Id. at 1576-78.
94. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
95. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
96. Justices Burger and Blackmun took no part in the decision of the case. Chief
Justice Burger was chapter president of the St. Paul Jaycees in 1935 and Justice Black-
mun is a former member of the Minneapolis Jaycees. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, July
4, 1984, at 10A, col. 4.
97. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 611. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion with
Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens joining. Justice O'Connor also joined in
Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and filed an opinion concurring in part as to Part
II of the Court opinion. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Id.
98. Justice Brennan examined the club's associational rights in two separate and
distinct lines of analysis; that of private association and expressive association. Id. at
617-18. Justice Brennan dismissed the club's right to private association on the basis
that the club had none of the intimate attachments that warranted this kind of constitu-
tional protection. Id. at 620-21. While Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Jaycees'
activities did involve to some degree a form of expression regarding political, economic,
or civic affairs, Justice Brennan found that the State's interest in assuring equal access
and opportunity for its citizens outweighed any slight interference the admission of
women might have on the Jaycees' freedom of expression. Id. at 626-27.
99. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The basic premise of Justice O'Connor's
argument was that Justice Brennan's analysis offered unequal protection when applied
on a wider scope. Commercial organizations should not enjoy any constitutional shelter,
despite their expressive activity, and expressive associations should enjoy complete pro-
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1. Justice Brennan's Opinion
Justice Brennan identified two kinds of association which
can be a basis for a constitutional right to discriminate:10 inti-
mate association1 ' and expressive association."0 2
Analyzing the first interest of private association, Justice
Brennan recognized that the Constitution protects certain inti-
mate relationships from "unjustified" state interference. 0 3
These intimate relationships are distinguished by such charac-
teristics as "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in de-
cision to begin and maintain an affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship.' 01 4 Justice Brennan
tection, despite competing state interests. For Justice O'Connor, the Jaycees' decision
was "relatively easy." Id. at 638. Justice O'Connor would have decided this opinion along
the grounds of whether the Jaycees were commercial or expressive. Id. at 638-39. Since
they were engaged in the business of selling memberships, they were commercial and
deserved no constitutional protection. Id.
100. Id. at 617-18. Justice Brennan also notes that these two separate associational
rights may coincide, and that freedom of association in both forms could be implicated.
Id. For example, an individual's choice of intimate acquaintances may be inextricably
tied with a mutual endeavor of political expression. Id.
101. Id. at 618. This freedom of association receives its protection as a "fundamen-
tal element of personal liberty." Id. Justice Brennan notes further that: "[t]he Court has
long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relation-
ships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Id.
For a more complete analysis of the right of independent association, see supra notes 56-
58 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 622. Throughout the opinion, Justice Brennan traces a line of precedents
where the Court was prepared to recognize a right of expressive association in order to
engage in the constitutionally protected activities of speech, petition, and assembly. Id.
at 622-29. Justice Brennan affirms this right of expressive association by recognizing
that:
[aiccording protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially
important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority . . . .Consequently, we have long
understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.
Id. at 622. (citations omitted). For a more detailed discussion on the right of expressive
association, see supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 618. Justice Brennan acknowledges that personal association is deserving
of constitutional protection because the formation of these "personal bonds" have been
instrumental in forming the "culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical
buffers between the individual and the power of the State." Id. at 618-19.
104. Id. at 620. Justice Brennan contrasts the most intimate of relationships with a
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
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determined that the Jaycees had not shown the kind of intimate
attachments necessary to warrant constitutional protection. 10 5
Justice Brennan states:
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor
selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation
and maintenance of the association involves the participation of
strangers to that relationship. Accordingly we conclude that the
Jaycees Chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might
afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to
exclude women.106
Justice Brennan next discussed the issue of expressive asso-
ciation and applies the balancing test discussed above. 107 First,
Justice Brennan recognized that implied within the first amend-
ment is a "corresponding right" to associate with others.10 8 Al-
though a number of the Jaycees' activities constituted a form of
protected expression, 10 9 Justice Brennan found no evidence that
the admission of women would in any way alter or interfere with
this expression.110 Therefore, the Court upheld the application
of Minnesota's Human Rights Act because the state interest waslegitimate and abridged no more speech or associational freedom
large business enterprise, or any other association, lacking in the requisite characteris-
tics. Id. While the characteristics Justice Brennan lists seem to be exclusively associated
with familial relationships, he suggests that other, less intimate relationships may be
entitled to some form of protection under the right of private association:
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of human relationships ....
Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter
into a particular association ... entails a careful assessment of where the relation-
ship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to
the most attenuated of personal attachments.
Id. See also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
105. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
109. Id. at 626 (examples of Jaycees activities constituting protected expressive ac-
tivities include: endorsement of President Reagan, regular engagement in "civic, charita-
ble, lobbying, fundraising and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under
the First Amendment."). Id. at 626-27.
110. Id. at 627. As Justice Brennan points out, conformance with Minnesota's
Human Rights Act would not impose "restrictions on the organization's ability to ex-
clude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members." Id.
23
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than was necessary to accomplish its purpose."'
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
According to Justice O'Connor, the real issue for the Court
to determine was whether the organization is primarily dedi-
cated to activity involving first amendment expression" 2 or
whether the organization is primarily commercial and only inci-
dentally, or minimally, partakes in first amendment
expression.'
Justice O'Connor recognized that some associations cannot
"readily be described as purely expressive or purely commer-
cial," and that a standard cannot be outlined with "simple preci-
sion. '" 4 To Justice O'Connor, an association becomes commer-
cial when its "activities are not predominantly that of the type
protected by the First Amendment." 1 5 Once an organization
makes the choice of leaving the marketplace of ideas for the
marketplace of commerce, it is subject to rationally related state
regulation and it loses its "complete control over its
membership.""'
111. Id. at 628-29. Acts of invidious discrimination which deny the public equal ac-
cess to goods, services or advantages, "cause unique evils that the government has a
compelling interest to prevent ...." Id. at 628.
112. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, an organi-
zation which is involved exclusively in expression, "enjoys First Amendment protection
of both the content of its message and the choice of its members." Id. Justice O'Connor
suggests that in this case, the Court would examine any legislation impeding association
with the same scrutiny it would examine legislation impeding speech. Id.
113. Id. at 634. Justice O'Connor states: "there is only minimal constitutional pro-
tection of the freedom of commercial associations." Id. (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 635. Justice O'Connor concedes a flaw in her analysis:
Clearly the standard must accept the reality that even the most expressive of as-
sociations is likely to touch, in some way or other, matters of commerce. The stan-
dard must nevertheless give substance to the ideal of complete protection for
purely expressive association, even while it readily permits state regulation of
commercial affairs.
Id. While Justice O'Connor reflects on what an appropriate standard for determining the
right of expressive associations should do, she never articulates what that standard
should be.
115. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, an association cannot endeavor to be both
commercial and expressive: "An association must choose its market." Id. at 636.
116. Id. at 636. Justice O'Connor concedes that the determination of just when an
association leaves the market place of ideas for the market place of commerce is "often
...difficult." Id. In examining this issue, the Court should consider the "purposes of an
association, and the purposes of its members in adhering to it." Id. The difficulty in
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B. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club
of Duarte
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club
of Duarte'17 is most significant for its application of the analysis
of Roberts v. United States Jaycees to a smaller, more selective
organization. 18 One of the effects of the Rotary decision was to
demonstrate that the Court did not intend to limit its decision
in Roberts to a narrow scope. Some commentators believed that
the Roberts decision, if narrowly drawn, would not apply to
smaller associations with more selective criteria. 1 9 In fact,
rather than narrowly drawing the Roberts decision, the Rotary
Court applies every major point raised in Roberts in the Rotary
opinion, and yet the two organizations are in many ways,
dissimilar.120
Rotary International is a nonprofit, worldwide corporation
whose membership is made up of 20,000 local Rotary Clubs in
157 countries.121 Members are selected to join a local Rotary
Club on the basis of their profession and the leadership role that
the individuals assumed within their profession. 22 The aim of
the membership criteria is to ensure that within each Rotary
Club there are two representatives of "every worthy and recog-
nized business, professional, or institutional activity in the com-
making this kind of determination is further exacerbated when Justice O'Connor points
out that while "[1]awyering to advance social goals may be speech," the practice of law is
not. Id. Justice O'Connor concedes the lines between expression and commercialization
can be "fluid and uncertain." Id. at 637.
117. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
118. Unlike the Jaycees in Roberts, whose members totaled over 250,000 nationwide,
the size of a local Rotary Club can vary from 10 to more than 900 members. Rotary, 481
U.S. at 546. In addition, the members of a Rotary Club belong to individual local clubs
and are not themselves members of the international organization. Id. at 539. The
Jaycees, in comparison, are members not only of their individual chapters but also mem-
bers of the state and national chapters. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613-14.
119. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 79, at 1878. The principal purpose of Linder's
article was to examine the implications of Roberts to other associations with restrictive
membership policies. Id. at 1878. While recognizing that Roberts could have enormous
long-term implications, Linder surmised that "[mlore probably, language in the opinion
will be used to limit application of anti-discrimination statutes to a handful, of organiza-
tions which employ the Jaycees' unusually aggressive recruitment policies." Id. at 1901.
For a discussion of the Roberts opinion, see supra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
121. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 540.
122. Id.
1990]
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munity.""'  According to the International Rotary Club Consti-
tution, membership is open only to men. 24
In 1977, the Rotary Club of Duarte, California decided to
admit three women to active membership.'2 5 Rotary Interna-
tional responded by revoking the local club's charter.'26 Rotary
Club of Duarte and its three women members filed a complaint
in the Superior Court of California alleging that Rotary Interna-
tional's actions were a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
27
which provides in pertinent part: "All persons within the juris-
diction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.' 28
The superior court, in an unpublished opinion, held that
neither Rotary International nor Rotary Club was a business es-
tablishment under the Act'2 9 and that any business benefits de-
rived from the club's membership are incidental to the club's
principal purpose.30 The California Court of Appeals reversed
the superior court's finding,' 3 ' holding that for the purposes of
the Unruh Act, both Rotary International and the local chapter
123. Id. However, there is no limit to the number of clergymen, journalists or diplo-
mats who can be admitted into membership. Id. (citing Rotary Manual of Procedure 31,
33 (1981)).
124. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541 (citing Standard Rotary Club Constitution, art. V, § 2).
Although women are not permitted to become members, they are invited to attend meet-
ings, give speeches and receive awards. Id.
125. Id. at 541. The local Rotary Club had the freedom to make this decision be-
cause "each local Rotary Club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting
new members." Id. at 540 (citing Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981)).
126. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541. The charter was revoked after an internal hearing be-
tween the International Club's Bd. of Directors and Rotary Club of Duarte. Id.
127. Id.
128. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
129. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 542 (citing Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at B-
3, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (No.
86-421)).
130. Id. The purported purpose of the club is to "provide humanitarian service, en-
courage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the
world." Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539 (quoting Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981)).
131. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), afi'd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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were business establishments1 32 and membership is an "advan-
tage" or "privilege" that was being denied individuals on the ba-
sis of sex.'33 The court held further that application of the Un-
ruh Act did not violate the first amendment associational rights
of its male members.1 34
In a 7-0 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the California Court of Appeals.135 In a two-part analysis, similar
to that found in Roberts,' Justice Powell upheld the California
statute and ordered reinstatement of the local Rotary Club's
charter.13 7
The first part of the Court's analysis entailed recognition of
the freedom to enter into and carry on intimate association
under the first amendment. 3 8 Using Roberts as a framework, the
Court held that the relationship among the Rotary Club mem-
bers was not the kind of intimate nature that the first amend-
132. Id. at 1055, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 226. Citing the testimony of the Rotary Club of
Duarte, the court held that there is "no doubt that business concerns are a motivating
factor in joining local clubs." Id. at 1057, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 226. As business establish-
ments, both the International Rotary and the Rotary Club of Duarte were prohibited
from arbitrarily discriminating. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
133. Rotary at 1059, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 277. Under the Unruh Act, all persons are
entitled to full and equal access to "advantages" and "privileges." CAL. CIv. CODE § 51
(West 1982). After examining Rotary literature and listening to testimony, the court of
appeals found Rotary membership to be an advantage or privilege because of the "busi-
ness benefits enjoyed upon by Rotarians and their businesses or employers." Rotary at
1057, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
134. Id. at 1062-65, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 229-31. The court found that Rotary was not
entitled to any rights under private association. Id. at 1064, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 230. While
the court noted that the membership criteria is highly selective, the fact that the ulti-
mate purpose of the membership is to increase membership, and the fact that local Ro-
tary clubs are required to admit any visiting Rotarians, negates any concept of an inti-
mate relationship. Id. The court also found that Rotary was not entitled to constitutional
protection under the freedom of expressive association. Id. at 1064, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
Stating that the right of expressive association is not absolute, the court held that an
infringement on Rotary's right is justified due to the compelling State interest in abol-
ishing sex discrimination in business establishments. Id. at 1065, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
135. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987). Justice O'Connor and Justice Blackmun did not participate in this case. Id. at
538.
136. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 544-45. For a discussion on the two-part analysis employed
by the Roberts Court, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
137. Rotary, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
138. Id. at 545-47. For more on the right of intimate association, see supra notes 61-
63 and accompanying text.
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ment was designed to protect.' 39 First, while the club maintains
a selective membership policy, it also encourages expansion of
its membership. 140 Further, the club's central activities are con-
ducted in the presence of strangers' 4 ' and members are en-
couraged to invite business associates to its meetings.'4 2
The second part of the Court's analysis dealt with the right
of expression. 14 3 As Justice Powell pointed out, the admission of
women would not require the Rotary Clubs to abandon their ac-
tivities, but may even aid them, since the clubs would have a
broader capacity for service and a more representative cross sec-
tion of the community. 4 Justice Powell went on to invoke Rob-
erts' balancing test, 4 5 stating that even if the implementation of
the Unruh Act works some "slight infringement on Rotary
Member's right of expressive association,""' California's interest
in eliminating discrimination against women justifies this
infringement.147
139. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546. In making this determination the Court applied the
same factors as that of Roberts: "size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are ex-
cluded from the critical aspects of the relationship." Id. See also, Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620.
140. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546. Justice Powell points out that local chapters are in-
structed to " 'keep a flow of prospects coming' to ... gradually enlarge membership." Id.
(quoting 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary 60-61). In addition, each club is in-
structed to not set arbitrary limits on the number of members it admits and to "establish
and maintain a membership growth pattern." Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547 (citing Rotary
Manual of Procedure 139 (1981)).
141. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 547. While club meetings are not open to the general pub-
lic, any Rotary member from another club may attend another club's meetings. Id. In
addition, the club seeks out coverage of its activities from the local papers. Id.
142. Id. at 547. "In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in an
atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their 'windows and doors open to the whole world.'"
Id.
143. Id. at 548. For more on the right of expression see supra notes 64-73 and ac-
companying text.
144. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548. While the clubs engage in a number of service activi-
ties, protected under the first amendment, it is the Rotary Clubs' policy not to take
positions. Id. (citing Rotary Manual of Procedure 115 (1981)). Justice Powell appears to
suggest that since the activity in which the club engages is not directly linked with Ro-
tary's all-male membership policy, the admission of women would not work any substan-
tial hardship on the exercise of their first amendment rights.
145. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549. See supra note 98 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion on the balancing test adopted in Roberts.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Court elevates public accommodations laws to "compelling state inter-
ests of the highest order." Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624).
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C. New York Club Association v. City of New York
New York State Club Association v. City of New York is
the most recent attempt by the Supreme Court to address the
conflict between state and local enforcement of anti-discrimina-
tion public accommodations statutes and the associational rights
of private organizations to select their own members. Although
addressing the same issues as Roberts v. United States Jaycees
and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, New York State Club Association concerned applica-
tion of Local Law 63 to organizations with far more selective
membership criteria than the Jaycees or Rotary Club. 48 More-
over, the New York City Public Accommodations Act, scruti-
nized in New York State Club Association, employed a rigid
three-part standard to determine whether or not a club was dis-
tinctly private." 9 These criteria were in marked contrast to the
fluid criteria endorsed by the Court in Roberts and Rotary. 50
The Court in Roberts and Rotary rested a large part of their
opinion on the fact that both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club
employed unselective membership criteria."" In comparison, the
clubs at issue in New York State Club Association are consid-
ered to be exclusive and exercise rigid standards as to whom
148. Brief for Appellant at 22, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108
S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. The brief argues that
the selective membership criteria employed by the member clubs of NYSCA distinguish
it from groups like the Jaycees and Rotary Club:
A club in which membership is determined by subjective, rather than objective,
criteria is one which was aimed to assure congeniality by purposefully including
persons of similar styles and tastes. In such a club, members are not fungible;
indeed, the loss or addition of even one can indelibly change the association's
character.
Id.
149. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). For a description of the three-
part criteria employed by Local Law 63, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying te.t.
150. In both Roberts and Rotary, the analysis focused on: the club's objective char-
ateristics and purpose, size, membership criteria, and the degree to which outsiders
were excluded from membership activity. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620.
151. In Roberts, the Court noted that "new members are routinely recruited and
admitted [into the Jaycees] with no inquiry into their backgrounds." Roberts, 468 U.S. at
621. In Rotary, the Court noted that the Rotary Clubs are "instructed to 'keep a flow of
prospects coming' . . . and . . . 'to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership.'"
Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546 (quoting 2 Rotary Basic Library, Club Service 9-11 (1981, App.
88)).
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they accept into membership.
1. Procedural History
a. The Parties
Appellant, New York State Club Association (hereinafter
NYSCA), is an incorporated association representing 125 of New
York State's private clubs and associations - a substantial
number of which are located in New York City.152 Appellees are
the City of New York, the Mayor of the City of New York, the
City Human Rights Commission (the enforcement agency for
New York City's public accommodations law), and the members
of the City Human Rights. Commission.1 53
b. Supreme Court of New York, New York County
The day after the enactment of Local Law 63, NYSCA filed
a complaint with the Supreme Court of New York, New York
County, seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law 63 was
unconstitutional.'" NYSCA also moved for a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin appellees from enforcing the law pending a
decision by the court as to the constitutionality of the law. 6
NYSCA challenged Local Law 63 on three grounds: 1) that
the statute unconstitutionally infringes upon the individual
member's right of free association; 2) that the statute is in con-
flict with state law; and 3) that the statute is overbroad and un-
constitutionally vague. 6 After cross motions for summary judg-
ment, Judge Greenfield upheld Local Law 63 and denied
NYSCA's motion for a preliminary injunction stating that
NYSCA had failed to demonstrate "a likelihood of success on
152. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2231 (1988).
The principal purpose of NYSCA is to promote its members' common interests by pro-
viding a structured forum in which to enhance communication and dissemination of in-
formation among its memberships. NYSCA represents only the clubs, not the clubs'
members. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 148, at 4.
153. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 148, at 5.
154. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 16.
155. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct at 2231.
156. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 25028/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 8, 1984), affd, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dep't 1986), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d
211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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the merits." '157
Judge Greenfield began his decision by pointing out that
both the federal government15 and New York State15 have al-
ready "entered the field" by enacting statutes to eliminate dis-
crimination in public accommodations.1 60 Such statutes are in
fact a constitutionally valid exercise of police power.' 1 The indi-
vidual interest in freedom of association is superseded by the
more compelling governmental interest in preventing discrimi-
nation against individuals.1 6 2
Judge Greenfield held further, that the State Human
Right's Law 6 3 did not "purport to pre-empt the field, [thereby]
leaving ... cities ... the right to create their own commission on
human relations." ' 4 Local Law 63 is not in conflict with the
state law but in fact, through its three-part test, supplements
the law by giving meaning to the term "distinctly private."' 5
Judge Greenfield dismissed NYSCA's overbreadth argu-
ments by stating "there ... [is no] merit to the contention that
the statute is overbroad."' e In addressing NYSCA's vagueness
argument, Judge Greenfield pointed out that the Local Law 63 is
actually less vague then New York's State statute and by impli-
cation passes "constitutional muster.' 6 7
157. Id. at 9.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-A(e) (1982).
159. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290-301 (McKinney 1983). Judge Greenfield explains in his
opinion that the law attempts to minimize any potential conflict with the right of associ-
ation by exempting "distinctly private clubs." Because the Law does not include a defini-
tion of what is "distinctly private," the term becomes a question of fact to be settled on
a case by case basis. New York State Club Ass'n, No. 25028/84, slip op. at 4.
160. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 25028/84, slip op. at 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 1984).
161. Id. at 3. Judge Greenfield describes the right of association as a "lesser right"
in light of the State's overriding interest in eliminating invidious discrimination. Id.
162. Id.
163. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1983).
164. New York State Club Ass'n, No. 25028/84 slip op. at 4.
165. Id. at 5. See also supra note 12 for the relevant text of Local Law 63.
166. New York State Club Ass'n, No. 25028/84 slip op. at 7.
167. Id.
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c. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
On direct appeal, the case went to the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court.1 68 The court affirmed the lower court deci-
sion, with one judge dissenting on the basis that Local Law 63's
exemption of religious and benevolent orders violates the equal
protection clause.1 69 The majority opinion gives only a brief af-
firmation of the lower court's decision and devotes most of its
energies countering the reasoning of Justice Kupferman, the
lone dissenter.
In his dissent, Justice Kupferman argued that Local Law
63, in its effort to eradicate discrimination, is itself discrimina-
tory by denying equal protection to persons similarly situated. 70
By shielding benevolent and religious organizations from the
reach of Local Law 63, the legislature has favored a similarly
situated class and thus, the due process and equal protection
clauses of both the New York State Constitution171 and the
United States Constitution 72 have been violated.
1 73
The majority countered Justice Kupferman's argument by
noting that it is statutorily recognized 1 74 that benevolent and ie-
ligious orders are founded primarily for the protection of their
members. 17 They are, by their very nature, not public.176 The
court reasoned further that such distinctions between ordinary
associations and benevolent and religious orders are not consti-
tutionally suspect.1 77 "'The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.' 178
168. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d
152 (1st Dep't 1986), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987),
aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
169. Id. at 393, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
170. Id. at 396, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
171. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 which states in relevant part: "No person shall be de-
nied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person
shall ... be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by
any firm, corporation, or institution ....
172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
173. New York State Club Ass'n, 118 A.D.2d at 397, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
174. N.Y. INs. LAW § 4501(a) (McKinney 1983).
175. New York State Club Ass'n, 118 A.D.2d at 393-94, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 394, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
178. Id. (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940)).
[Vol. 10:273
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION
d. Court of Appeals of New York
In an opinion by Chief Justice Wachtler, the New York
State Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions in
favor of the appellees.' e The initial issue addressed by the
Court of Appeals was whether Local Law 63 is inconsistent with
New York State's public accommodations law.180 If the two laws
are not compatible, the passage of Local Law 63 is an invalid
exercise of New York City's police power and a violation of the
"home rule" provision' 8' of the New York State Constitution. 8 2
Under the "home rule" provision, local governments are
given broad police power relating to the welfare of their citi-
zens. 183 However, this broad grant of authority to local govern-
ments has two exceptions.'" First, the city can not pass a law
pursuant to its police power that is explicitly or implicitly incon-
sistent with state constitutional or general law.8 5 Second, the
local government cannot exercise its police power in an area
where the state legislature has explicitly or implicitly preempted
the area of regulation. 86
179. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d
915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987).
180. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1983). This law is New York's public accom-
modations statute. Similar to its New York City counterpart, the New York State law
makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person in a place of public accom-
modation to deny another on the basis of sex "any of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, or privileges thereof." Id. at § 296(2)(a). In the tradition of virtually every pub-
lic accommodations statute that has come before or after it, the statute also excludes
from its definition of public accommodation any "institution, club, or place of accommo-
dation which is in its nature distinctly private." Id. at § 292(9); see also New York State
Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 218, 505 N.E.2d at 918, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
181. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c) (McKinney 1983) which provides in pertinent part:
In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in any other
law . . . (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law
relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, af-
fairs or government of such local government:
(10) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of
persons or property therein.
182. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 216, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 351.
183. Id. at 217, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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In determining whether New York City had in fact violated
"home rule," Justice Wachtler put particular emphasis on the
state legislature's failure to define the term "distinctly private"
in its exclusion of private clubs from the ambit of the public
accommodations statute.18 Justice Wachtler concluded that this
omission by the state legislature implies an intention to allow
local government to adopt its own definition of what is distinctly
private, so long as the definition is not inconsistent with the
broad meaning of the term in the state statute.188
NYSCA argued that the rigid criteria outlined in the three-
part test of Local Law 63189 conflicts with the more flexible crite-
ria applied to the state statute in United States Power Squad-
rons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board.190 In Power Squad-
rons, the New York Court of Appeals set forth a flexible test
detailing five factors which may be considered in determining
whether a club is "distinctly private."'' These five factors in-
clude whether the club (1) Has permanent machinery estab-
lished to carefully screen applicants ... ; (2) limits the use of the
facilities and the services of the organization to members and
bona fide guests of members; (3) is controlled by the member-
ship; (4) is nonprofit and operated solely for the benefit and
pleasure of its members; and (5) directs its publicity exclusively
and only to members for their information and guidance.
The crucial factor behind the Power Squadrons decision
was whether the association practiced selectivity in its member-
ship."" In contrast, local Law 63 significantly departs from this
emphasis and does not include selective membership as a factor
187. Id. at 218-19, 505 N.E.2d at 917-18, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52.
188. Id. at 219, 505 N.E.2d at 918, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 352-53. New York State's Public
Accommodations statute defines public accommodations as "any institution, club or
place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private." N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 290
(McKinney 1983).
189. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
190. 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, appeal dismissed, 60
N.Y.2d 682, 455 N.E.2d 666, 468 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1983). Power Squadrons involved the all-
male membership policy of a nonprofit corporation whose purposes included promotion
of safety and skill in boating. Id. at 407, 452 N.E.2d at 1201, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
191. Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 412-13, 452 N.E.2d at 1215, 465 N.Y.S.2d at
880.
192. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 221, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 351. See also, Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 412, 452 N.E.2d at 1215, 465 N.Y.S.2d
at 879.
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to be considered.' Nevertheless, Justice Wachtler determined
that Local Law 63's three-part test was consistent with the
meaning of New York's Human Rights Law as interpreted in
Power Squadrons.'9 4 The three part test is not exclusive and
nothing in Local Law 63 prohibits the consideration of member-
ship selectivity or any of the other criteria outlined in Power
Squadrons.'""
The court then addressed the issue of whether "Local Law
63 violates... [NYSCA] members' right to privacy, free speech
and association under the Federal Constitution.' '196 Addressing
first the right of intimate association,' 97 the court followed the
precedent established under Roberts v. United States
Jaycees.'8 The court reasoned that both the criteria outlined in
Power Squadrons, and the objectives of Local Law 63's three-
part test, adequately assess the objective characteristics outlined
in Roberts for determining whether an organization's activities
are entitled to the protected freedom of intimate association.' 99
Applying a balancing test, similar to that in Roberts,00 the court
of appeals determined that the application of Local Law 63
would not violate the rights of expressive association afforded to
the members of NYSCA's clubs.2 0' First, any incidental infringe-
ment of the members' first amendment rights is justified since
the city has a greater, more compelling interest, in ensuring
equal access to "advantages" and "privileges" for all people. 02
193. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 221, 505 N.E.2d at 917, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 351. See also, Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 412, 452 N.E.2d at 1215, 465 N.Y.S.2d
at 879.
194. Id.
195. Id. For a listing of the five factors listed in Power Squadrons, see supra note
191 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
198. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
199. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 222, 505 N.E.2d at 920, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 355. The Court in Roberts stated that criteria such as "size, purpose, policies, selectiv-
ity, [and] congeniality" are relevant considerations in determining whether an associa-
tion is private. 468 U.S. at 620. See also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for
more on private association.
200. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-29; see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
201. New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 355.
202. Id.
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Second, Local Law 63 is designed to achieve its ends through the
least restrictive means and interferes with the policies and activ-
ities of NYSCA's members only to the extent necessary to pre-
vent invidious discrimination. 0 3 In fact, the court found that
NYSCA has failed to show that any of its members' free speech
rights would actually be abridged or chilled by the admission of
women. 0" Finally, the court reminded NYSCA and its members
that, although they may have a right to engage in first amend-
ment activity, they do not have a corresponding right to practice
invidious discrimination against women.2 5
2. The Supreme Court of the United States
a. Majority Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals." 6 Jus-
tice White, writing for the majority, 207 held that: first, NYSCA
had standing to challenge Local Law 63;208 second, Local Law 63
does not infringe upon NYSCA's individual member's rights of
private or expressive association; 20 9 third, Local Law 63 is not
overbroad;2 1° and finally, Local Law 63's exemption of benevo-
lent and religious corporations does not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.211
The Court began its opinion by addressing the issue of
whether NYSCA had standing to sue on behalf of individual
club members who are not technically members of NYSCA2 12
Appellees argued that NYSCA lacked standing because it was an
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 224, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
206. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
207. Id. at 2229. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a separate con-
curring opinion. Justice Scalia also filed a separate opinion concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment.
208. Id. at 2232.
209. Id. at 2234.
210. Id. at 2234-35.
211. Id. at 2235-37.
212. Id. at 2231. See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a description of
NYSCA and its membership. NYSCA represents only the clubs themselves and not the
individuals who make up the club's membership.
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association made up of clubs, and not an association made up of
the individuals whose first amendment rights were being as-
serted.2 13 "In other words, [NYSCA] . . . is twice removed from
any individual and is attempting to assert the constitutional
rights of these individuals, that are not themselves members of
[NYSCA]. '21 4 The Court, citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Ad-
vertising Commission,21' held that an association has standing to
sue on behalf of its members when those members would have
had standing to bring the same suit.2 16 Justice White determined
that NYSCA had standing in this case because the individual
clubs that make up NYSCA would have had standing to bring
this same suit on behalf of their members.17
The opinion went on to respond to NYSCA's argument that
Local Law 63 is facially unconstitutional. 18 Justice White began
213. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2232. See also, Brief for Appellee,
supra note 30, at 20.
214. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 30, at 20.
215. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). The Court upheld the standing of what was technically a
state agency but actually a trade association to sue on behalf of its member apple grow-
ers to challenge the constitutionality of another state's law affecting the apple growers.
Id. In Hunt, the Court outlined a three-part test to determine when an association has
standing to sue on behalf of its members: When (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id. at 343.
Appellees tried to argue that NYSCA had not satisfied part (a) of the test. Appellees
interpreted part (a) to require that the clubs which make up NYSCA must have standing
to sue on behalf of themselves, irrespective of standing to sue on behalf of their mem-
bers. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2232.
216. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. The Court noted that the first
part of the Hunt test was a means to weed out plaintiffs, who otherwise would not have
standing to bring suit, from manufacturing standing by posing as a representative. Id.
217. Id. at 2232. The Court noted further that NYSCA's member clubs also have
standing to bring suit against appellees on behalf of their individual members since the
individual members "are suffering immediate or threatened injury" to their associational
rights. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
218. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 2233. NYSCA could have waited until
the City of New York had, under Local Law 63, issued a cease-and-desist order against
one of its club members for its discriminatory practices. At this point, the club, or
NYSCA as its representative, could have sought judicial review of the order. Id. Instead,
NYSCA chose to institute this action upon immediate passage of Local Law 63, claiming
the Law was facially unconstitutional. Id. This type of strategy, however, places a heavy
burden on the challenger, who must show that either every application of the statute is
unconstitutional, or that the statute is a threat to the exercise of first amendment activ-
ity-that its mere presence "on the books" has a serious chilling effect. Id.
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his analysis by explaining that when confronted with a facial
challenge, NYSCA has the burden to demonstrate219 that either,
the statute "'could never be applied in a valid manner' or even
though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it
nevertheless is so broad that it 'may inhibit the constitutionally
protected speech of third parties.' "220
The Court determined that NYSCA was unable to prevail
on either of these challenges.221 NYSCA conceded during oral
arguments that Local Law 63 could be constitutionally applied
to some clubs.22 This concession by plaintiff's counsel virtually
ended any possibility of a successful facial attack on the grounds
that it "could never be applied in a valid manner. "223
Justice White then considered whether Local Law 63 affects
in "any significant way" an individual's right of intimate associ-
ation.2  By conducting what could be coined a "side by side"
analysis, the Court determined that the criteria used in Local
Law 63's three-part test 223 was "at least as significant in defining
the non-private nature of these associations" as the criteria the
Court applied in Roberts and Rotary.226
219. This kind of facial challenge will not succeed unless plaintiff can show that
"every application of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas."
Id. at 2233 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
220. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233 (quoting Vincent, 466 U.S. at
798). This second type of facial challenge, called the "overbreadth doctrine," springs
from the recognition by the courts that first amendment expression is as likely to be
inhibited by the threatened use of power as the actual use of power. Id. This type of
challenge will not succeed unless the court finds the statute to be substantially over-
broad. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)).
221. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
222. Id. at 2233. Alan Mansfield, a partner at Philips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim &
Ballon represented NYSCA. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Mansfield under-
went repeated questioning by Justices White, Scalia and Kennedy about whether Local
Law 63 could ever be applied consitutionally. Id. at 3, col. 1. "Only after Justice Ken-
nedy followed up on Justice White's question whether there might be a case where the
statute could be applied without offending the constitution, did Mr. Mansfield yield
ground and recognize that such a class of cases was 'conceivable.'" Id. at 3, col. 2.
223. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. See supra note 219 and accom-
panying text.
224. Id. at 2234. For a detailed discussion on the right of intimate association, see
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
226. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. Justice White also stated that
the fact that intimate association may occur in this setting does not mean that the set-
ting itself is entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 2234. See supra notes 104 and
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For example, the Court did not find Local Law 63's 400
member requirement 227 to be unreasonable. 228 Four hundred is
roughly consistent with the size of the Jaycees organization in
Roberts. The Court determined in Roberts that the size of a
group is a significant factor in determining whether that group
can claim a legitimate right of intimate association.2 2 In fact,
Local Law 63's 400 member requirement is less of a restriction
on the right of intimate association than Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte. In Rotary, the
Court found that an association of approximately twenty people
was not private enough to warrant the protection of the right of
intimate association.230
Similarly, the Court drew a parallel between the statute's
requirements of "regular meal service 2 31 and the regular receipt
of payments "directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-
members,"23 2 with the Court's emphasis in Roberts and Rotary
of the fact that strangers regularly participated at the Jaycees
and Rotary Club meetings. 33 Justice White explained that both
sets of criteria, while seemingly quite different, are aimed at the
same goal - to determine the non-private nature of these
associations.234
The Court drew similar conclusions when determining
whether Local Law 63 significantly infringes upon an individ-
ual's right of expressive association. 35 Justice White recognized
139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria the Court applied in Roberts
and Rotary.
227. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
228. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. For a discussion concerning the
New York City Council's motivation in choosing the number "four hundred" for their
membership criteria, see supra note 45.
229. Id. at 620.
230. Id. at 546-47. Of course, the Rotary Court took more into account than the size
of the clubs at issue. Other factors considered included "purpose, selectivity, and
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship." Id. at 546 (citing
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620).
231. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
232. Id. See also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for a discussion as to
why the New York City Council adopted this criteria for Local Law 63.
233. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2234. For a detailed discussion on the right of expressive association, see
supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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that expression is enhanced by group association and that there
is a "'close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assem-
bly.' ,236 Justice White concluded, however, that the "selective
process or inclusion and exclusion is [not protected in every set-
ting] by the Constitution. ' 237 Furthermore, the Court's opinion
concluded that Local Law 63 does not prevent individuals from
forming associations for the expression of certain viewpoints.2 38
A club formed for the purpose of expressing one point of view
may certainly deny membership to an individual expressing a
contrary point of view.239 "Instead, the law merely prevents an
association from using race, sex, and the other specified charac-
teristics as shorthand measures in place of . . . more legitimate
criteria for determining membership. 2 0
Having thoroughly concluded that the first type of facial at-
tack is without merit, the Court turned to the second theory on
which a facial attack may be brought, the overbreadth doc-
trine. 21' The Court determined that NYSCA must fail on this
second part of its facial attack. 2  The Court points out that at
no time during oral or written testimony did NYSCA inform the
Court of the specific characteristics of any of its member-clubs,
let alone the characteristics of those clubs that stand to suffer
236. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 347 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
237. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234. Just as the freedom of speech is
not absolute, neither is the freedom of expressive association. See supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text.
238. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
239. Id. For example, a club which affirmatively expresses a conservative point of
view may deny membership to liberals on the basis of their contrary values. But the
same club cannot dismiss women per se on the assertion that they tend to be more lib-
eral. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
240. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234. The Court suggests that if the
clubs at issue had an affirmative expressive purpose - to promote one gender over an-
other, for example - then the summary dismissal of women on the basis of gender
might be a legitimate membership criteria. The Court however, seems to adopt the opin-
ion of the New York City Council and appellees, that the purpose of these clubs is to
develop business contacts, (see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text), and the dis-
missal of women on the basis of their sex is not a legitimate membership criteria to
further the clubs' purpose. Id.
241. Id. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
242. Id. The Court notes that the use of the overbreadth doctrine in a facial attack,
is "strong medicine" that should be used "sparingly and only as a last resort." Id. (quot-
ing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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injury at the hands of "overbroad" legislative criteria.4
NYSCA argued, however, that the law was overbroad be-
cause it created an "irrebuttable presumption" that clubs cov-
ered under the three-part test were not private.4 Justice White
determined that the law's presumption, if it exists at all, is re-
buttable since the law allows a hearing in which a defendant
club may produce evidence to show that it does not fall within
the ambit of the statute.4 Should the Human Rights Commis-
sioner rule against the club, the club is entitled to seek judicial
review.2 "4 As Justice White concludes, "[t]hese opportunities for
individual associations to contest the constitutionality of the
243. Id. at 2235. This was a point that counsel for appellees, Peter L. Zimroth,
stressed during his oral arguments before the Court:
Stressing the hypothetical nature of the club association's challenge, Mr. Zimroth
added that it is 'hard to think of any club that could claim a constitutional right
to be excluded despite falling within the parameters of the statute and Mr. Mans-
field [counsel for appellants] has not mentioned a single club that would.
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
244. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2235. Appellants also contended that
the effect of this law made it impossible for clubs to argue the constitutionality of the
statute in individual administrative and judicial hearings. Id. This gives some explana-
tion as to why NYSCA chose to bear the heavy burden of a facial attack on the statute if
NYSCA really believed that no other forum was available to them in which to raise a
constitutional attack on the statute. Justice White dismissed NYSCA's argument. Justice
White stated that even if NYSCA's assertions were true as to the impossiblity of raising
constitutional issues in administrative hearings, it would not affect his analysis. Id. He
stated:
Although the city's Human Rights Commissioner may not be empowered to con-
sider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates .... it would be
quite unusual if the Commissioner 'could not construe its own statutory mandate
in the light of federal constitutional principles.' And even if this were also true,
nothing in the law purports to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims
that may be raised on appeal from the administrative enforcement proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted). (quoting Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools,
477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986)).
245. Id. at 2232. Local Law 63 authorizes New York City's Human Rights Commis-
sioner, or any injured party, to initiate a complaint against a club which falls within the
parameters of the statute and has allegedly discriminated in violation of the Public Ac-
commodations Statute. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). The Commis-
sioner investigates the complaint and if probable cause is found can settle the matter or
schedule a hearing in which the club should be prepared to present evidence and answer
charges against it. After a hearing the Commissioner can either dismiss the complaint or
issue a cease-and-desist order. Id. at § 8-109(2).
246. Id. at § 8-110 which states in relevant part: "Any complainant, respondent or
other person aggrieved by such order of the commission may obtain judicial review
thereof, and the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement, in a pro-
ceeding as provided in this section."
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Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure
that any overbreadth under the Law will be curable through a
case-by-case analysis of specific facts. 247NYSCA's final contention was that the law's exemption of
benevolent and religious corporations 248 is a violation of the
equal protection clause.249 Since no fundamental constitutional
interests are at stake, 50 the Court refused to apply heightened
scrutiny and instead held that the "equal protection challenge
must fail unless the city could not reasonably believe that the
exempted organizations are different in relevant respects from
appellant's members. 251 The Court accepted as reasonable the
City Council's explanation that religious and benevolent organi-
zations are "different in kind" and not centers where business
activity is prevalent.2 52 Since NYSCA had failed to produce evi-
dence to show that the benevolent and religious organizations
are in fact identical to the private clubs covered under Local
Law 63, any facial attack under the equal protection clause
could not be upheld.8 3
247. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
248. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) which states in relevant part:
For the purposes of this section a corporation incorporated under the benevolent
orders law or described in that benevolent orders law but formed under any other
law of this state, or a religious corporation incorporated under the education law
or the religious corporations law shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly
private.
See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
249. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2236. It is this issue that received some of the greatest skepticism by the
Court:
Mr. Zimroth [council for the Appellees] . .. evoked arch replies as he argued that
the continued exemption of fraternal and religious organizations from the reach of
the statute did not violate the constitution since there was no evidence before the
City Council that their conduct had been problematic.
Similarly, when Mr. Zimroth argued that with a club as large as 10,000 members it
is not 'credible' to argue that associational rights exist 'as an extension of one's
living room," Justice Kennedy interjected [in response to their exemption from
the statute] "unless you are a member of the American Legion or an Elk."
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
253. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2237.
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b. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
The purpose of O'Connor's concurring opinion'54 was to
note that nothing in the majority opinion should be construed as
a denigration of the "importance of any associational interests at
stake."" ' Justice O'Connor reminds the reader that the Court,
in upholding Local Law 63, intended for the criteria in the stat-
ute's three-part test to be nonexclusive.2 5
The associational interests of a private club have not been
denigrated because the club is "permitted to demonstrate that
its particular characteristics qualify it for constitutional protec-
tion, despite the presence of the three factors specified in Local
Law 63. ''257 For example, Justice O'Connor hypothesized that in
a cosmopolitan city the size of New York, it is likely that an
organization could satisfy Local Law 63 and still be so "intimate
in nature" to be "deserving of constitutional protection. 258
However, the law is effective since it can identify and be applied
against "predominantly commercial organizations" that attempt
to hide behind a purported right of association while practicing
invidious discrimination."
254. Id. Justice O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Justice Kennedy.
255. Id.
256. Id. Justice O'Connor points out that these factors should be considered along
with other criteria such as "size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality and other
characteristics." Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. What Justice O'Connor fails to point out, however, is that if such a club
exists, it may be forced to go through several hearings, in front of the Human Rights
Commissioner and the courts, before its rights of association are affirmatively recognized.
See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
259. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2237. The majority found Local Law
63's three-part test significant in determining whether a club is private or public. Id. at
2233. See also supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. In comparison, Justice
O'Connor sees the same criteria as effective in ferreting out commercial organizations,
which Justice O'Connor feels per se undeserving of constitutional protection. Id. Justice
O'Connor's analysis in New York State Club Ass'n, is consistent with her analysis in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), in
which she suggested that the Court's proper method of analysis should be whether the
club was predominantly commercial or expressive. Id. at 631. See also supra notes 112-
16 and accompanying text.
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c. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in order to add to
the Court's analysis of NYSCA's equal protection claim.2 60 Jus-
tice Scalia points out that the bulk of the benevolent organiza-
tions exempt from Local Law 63 are lodges and fraternal organi-
zations.26 Justice Scalia states that a lodge is not the type of
atmosphere where most men are likely to bring business
clients.262
IV. Analysis
What kind of importance can we place on New York State
Club Association? The individuals who are affected by this deci-
sion are not part of an economic or socially underprivileged
group. The players in this case, even those who are the victims
of discrimination, are not the powerless, but the powerful. 263
New York State Club Association, however, is significant in sev-
eral respects. There is little room for doubt that the City Coun-
cil accurately determined that the exclusive downtown men's
clubs were centers of business activity.264 The ruling in New
York State Club Association has essentially led to a demise of
the downtown all-male club 2 5 and gaining equal access for
260. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2238.
261. Id. at 2238. Justice Scalia lists several of the lodges and fraternal organizations
that are exempted: the American Legion, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States,
the Catholic War Veterans, the Disabled American Veterans, AM-Vets, the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, Masons, the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, the Loyal Order of
Moose, the Knights of Columbus, the Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of the
Elks of the World, the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine, and the Knights of Malta. Id.
262. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2238. During oral arguments in which
appellees argued that benevolent and religious orders did not foster the business oppor-
tunities of other clubs and were therefore exempt, Justice Scalia observed that the prob-
lem with this kind of analysis "is how to insure that the legislators are not 'legislating
against my clubs but exempting their own clubs.'" N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1988 at 3, col. 2.
263. The women who are being discriminated against are those who are conceivably
qualified for the top executive positions in the largest companies. See supra notes 27-30
and accompanying text. The men that are now forced to open their "private sanctum" to
women are some of the most powerful and successful men in the country. See supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
265. Clubs which have now opened their doors to women include: the University
Club of New York City (nine women admitted since June, 1987), the Harmonie Club of
New York City (previously open only to wives and widows), and the Friars Club of Bev-
erly Hills (policy open to women in California was not reciprocated in New York) to
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/7
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION
women to business opportunities within these clubs is clearly an
important accomplishment.266
What may be even more important than the achievement of
equal access, however, is the destruction of a vehicle that so-
cially stigmatized women.6 7 New York State Club Association
not only desegregates the men's clubs but diffuses them. Once
the discriminatory policy is taken away, so is the invidious
power that accompanies the all-male policy.2 68 There is no
longer any just rationalization for relegating women to back
stairwells, side entrances, service elevators, or separate dining
rooms.
26 9
Some critics may argue that sex discrimination against the
privileged and educated woman, (the kind of woman that would
seek access into these powerful men's clubs), is hardly a matter
that can elicit much concern from the average citizen. Sex dis-
crimination, however, in any mode, carries symbolic baggage.
The practice of relegating female guests to separate dining
rooms, separate entrances, or separate organizations is an as-
sault to a person's self worth and integrity. The demeaning na-
ture of this practice cannot be excused by the argument that
this is the interpretation that women choose to attach to the
practice, since symbols of inferiority, once believed and internal-
ized, can become self-perpetuating.2 7
When associational policy is governed by sexual stereotyp-
ing, the result can be detrimental to the empowered class as
well. Those who have little experience accepting women in a so-
cial setting are less likely to accept women in the professional
setting. It is in this setting that the state and local government
name but a few. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 1988 at 4, cols. 4 and 5.
266. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
270. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Plessy Court dismissed the argument that separate facili-
ties place a badge of inferiority on blacks by saying that this is a social stigma which can
only be overcome by the voluntary consent of society. Id. at 551. Fifty-eight years later,
the Brown Court overruled this kind of rationalization saying that legally tolerated seg-
regation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown, 347 U.S. at
494.
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have a compelling interest.271
The decision in New York State Club Association and the
passage of Local Law 63, has led to similar legislation through-
out the country that could portend a virtual nationwide end to
the all-male businessman's club. One important difference be-
tween Local Law 63 and its clones, however, is that only New
York City excludes from its reach benevolent orders.272 Other
cities that have enacted similar legislation to Local Law 63 in-
clude Boston,273 San Francisco,2 7' Los Angeles, 275 Chicago,276
Washington, D.C.,2 77 and Buffalo.2 78
Despite all that New York State Club Association accom-
plishes, however, the case is a disappointment. After New York
State Club Association, the rights of association are more dif-
fuse than ever before. The Court fails to establish any clear cut
guidelines for determining the extent to which this important
right exists.2 79 Thus, the status of the right of association re-
271. See Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 123 (1986)
(citing "a substantial array of social science research that indicates that individuals who
appear dissimilar are more likely to be disliked and avoided in work-related contexts").
272. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 148, at 48 and n.24 which states: "Un-
doubtedly the only basis for Local Law 63's [exclusion of benevolent and religious or-
ders] .. .was its political expediency. Absent the exemption presumably no law could
have passed." The brief also quotes an editorial published in the Daily News discussing
an earlier proposal of Local Law 63 which contained the same exclusion. The editorial
attacked the law as "blatantly hypocritical." "The American Legion and the Elks are
excluded, we're told, because they're benevolent associations. What's benevolent about
excluding women? In fact, those organizations are exempted because [Mayor] Koch and
[City Council President] Bellamy know they'd lose if they tried to take on the Legion."
Daily News, Dec. 28, 1983, at 33, col. 3.
273. Rule of Boston Licensing Board pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138
(West 1974). This rule prohibits discrimination by clubs licensed for the sale of alcoholic
beverages to members or guests if such club is not distinctly private and employs its
facilities and its alcoholic beverages license for commercial purposes. The criteria set
down to determine if a club is distinctly private include: 1) size; 2) regular meal service;
and 3) payments for dues, fees, use of services, etc. from members or nonmembers in
furtherance of professional interests.
274. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 33B (1987). The criteria in this code is
identical to Local Law 63 except that it exempts only institutions organized exclusively
for religious purposes - there is no exemption for benevolent associations.
275. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 5.9 § 45.95.01 (1987). This code is identical
to the San Francisco code.
276. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 199A (1981).
277. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519 (1981).
278. BUFFALO, N.Y., CITY ORDINANCES art. XXIII, ch. VII (1983).
279. The Court upholds the three-part test set forth in Local Law 63, finding it "at
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mains unclear and elusive. The ruling in New York State Club
Association may serve not only to subrogate this right to more
compelling state interests, but may also serve to "chill" the free
exercise of activity constitutionally protected under the first
amendment. ' °
New York State Club Association is an exemplification of
the problem inherent in applying anti-discrimination legisla-
tion2"' to private organizations. Roberts, Rotary, and New York
State Club Association are all examples of the Court's reluc-
tance, in the face of the compelling state interest to combat in-
vidious discrimination," 2 to establish any clear parameters on
the right of association. 8a Instead, each opinion is narrowly tai-
least as significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations" as the criteria
laid out in Roberts and Rotary. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S.
Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988). Thus, the Court accepts the rigid standard of Local Law 63, while
never rejecting the conflicting flexible standard of Roberts and Rotary.
280. In Board of Airport Comm'rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987), the Court described the "chill" factor that can occur when state
imposed restrictions on constitutional freedoms are not properly narrowed and focused:
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own
speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face
"because it also threatens others not before the court - those who desire to en-
gage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially valid."
Id. at 2571 (citations omitted).
In Appellant's Brief, petitioners also allude to a chilling effect of Local Law 63:
Under Local Law 63 there . . . exists a substantial likelihood that associations
which are organized around the most cherished of all constitutional protections,
viz., the exercise of political speech and religious freedom, will be chilled by the
prospect of the very kind of governmental interference that the first amendent
was intended to prohibit . . . . In addition, other groups who are not currently
subject to Local Law 63 will have their associational, speech and privacy rights
chilled by the local law. For example, a social, political or cultural club presently
composed of 373 members will avoid increasing its membership for fear of coming
within the provision's 400 members criterion and exposing its members to an in-
vestigation to ascertain whether it is indeed a place of public accomodation.
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 148, at 40.
281. See, e.g., NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(2) (1986).
282. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625 (holding state's interest extends beyond the
victim of discrimination, society suffers from being denied the "benefits of wide partici-
pation in political, economic, and cultural life"). Id.
283. The right of association is as equally compelling to the individual as the state's
interest in combating invidious discrimination. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (holding freedom of association is deserving of full constitutional
protection); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) ("Government may
not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as
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lored to the facts of the individual case. For example, the Court
urged flexibility and adopted a balancing test in Roberts284 and
Rotary,28 5 but then gave constitutional favor to the rigid test
laid out in New York State Club Association - while never re-
jecting the criteria of Roberts and Rotary.288 As a result, after
New York State Club Association, several conflicting criteria ex-
ist for determining if an organization is entitled to the right of
association.287 On the one hand, the Court's emphasis in Roberts
and Rotary was focused on whether an association had placed
itself in a public or private sphere.288 On the other hand, the
criteria in Local Law 63 does not examine the nature of the rela-
tionship between the association and the public but instead, un-
dertakes a commercial standard.2 89
In his majority opinion, Justice White tries to draw parallels
between the two sets of standards, 90 but his analysis falls short.
The Court's inconsistency with prior case law can be exemplified
by applying the Rotary and Roberts standards to the exclusive
clubs sought to be eliminated by Local Law 63. Under the Ro-
tary and Roberts standard, the club's selective membership cri-
teria and their elitist purposes, could remain unscathed.291 If the
selective as he desires."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association ... is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
... [Sitate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.").
284. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
285. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 544-45. See also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
286. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988).
287. See supra notes 20-21.
288. The criteria the Court considered in determining the private nature of an or-
ganization was size, purpose, selectivity in its membership and willingness to involve out-
siders in the critical aspects of the relationship. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468
U.S. at 620.
289. See New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
290. Justice White claimed for example, that Local Law 63's 400 member require-
ment was consistent with the Court's examination of size in Roberts and Rotary. New
York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620. Similarly, the Law's regular meal service requirement and receipt of payment from
outside members requirement were parallel to the Roberts and Rotary examination of
whether strangers participated in the critical aspects of the relationship. See New York
State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
291. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630 The Court suggests that the criteria adopted in
Roberts, including whether the club has an exclusive membership policy, would serve to
bring such clubs as the Kiwanis International Organization and "other private organiza-
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Court's emphasis was still rooted solely on whether an organiza-
tion was private or public, the selective membership policies of
NYSCA's clubs, aimed at excluding the public, would have likely
been taken into consideration. Instead, the Court acknowledges
Local Law 63's requirements of regular meal service, and even
more importantly, the receipt of money on behalf of members or
nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business "92 to be
"significant in pinpointing organizations which are 'commercial'
in nature" '293 as well as "defining . . . the nonprivate nature of
these associations. '294
In fact, the criteria of Local Law 63,295 is more akin to a
hybrid of the commercial standard for expressive association
outlined by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion of Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees.296 Justice O'Connor argued that
commercial organizations, like commercial speech, should be
subject to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.297 The
Court should instead establish a presumption of validity for reg-
ulations affecting the associational activity of commercial orga-
nizations. 298 This would not only do away with the burden of
subjecting every regulation to first amendment analysis, but
would also do away with the unnecessary judicial hurdle the leg-
islature would have to clear in order to demand an end to dis-
crimination in the membership practices of commercial
organizations.
Further, the Court's discussion of intimate association in
Roberts and Rotary focused more on the relationships between
the members.299 Roberts stated that in determining state author-
ity over intimate association the analysis "unavoidably entails a
tions" outside the ambit of the statute. Id.
292. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
293. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
294. Id.
295. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). See supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
296. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (The actual issue for
the Court is not whether the organization is public or private but whether the organiza-
tion has entered the commercial marketplace and is thus not entitled to the freedom of
association.). See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
297. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634.
298. Id. Justice O'Connor states: "the State is free to impose any rational regulation
on the commercial transaction itself." Id. at 634.
299. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20.
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careful assessment of where that relationship's object character-
istics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most
attenuated of personal attachments."300
In comparison, the Court in New York State Club Associa-
tion readily acknowledges that "[iut may well be that a consider-
able amount of private or intimate association occurs in such [a
private club] setting, as is also true in many restaurants and
other places of public accommodation, but that fact alone does
not afford the constitutional immunity to practice discrimina-
tion when the Government has barred it from doing so.'"30' This
kind of reasoning appears to be in line with what Justice
O'Connor stated in Roberts: "An association must choose its
market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any s-ub-
stantial degree it loses the complete control over its member-
ship. 3 02 Similarly, the Court recognizes that effective advocacy
is enhanced by group association.303 The Court nonetheless ac-
knowledges that such expression in some settings, (i.e., commer-
cial settings) does not warrant constitutional protection.'
We cannot assume, however, that the Court is clearly de-
parting from its former standards in Roberts and Rotary. The
Court states only that the new criteria approved of in New York
State Club Association is "at least as significant" in defining the
rights of association.30 5 The ambiguity as to which standard to
apply is further enhanced by Justice O'Connor's cryptic state-
ments that she writes separately "only to note that nothing in
the Court's opinion in any way undermines or denigrates the im-
portance of any associational interests at stake" and that the cri-
teria outlined in Local Law 63 are "not exclusive" and should be
"considered along with other considerations. ' 30 6
An additional difficulty with the commercial analysis
300. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. This reasoning was affirmed in Rotary, 481 U.S. at
546.
301. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233-34
(1988).
302. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636.
303. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
304. Id. ("This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which individuals
exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion
and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.") Id.
305. Id. at 2233.
306. Id. at 2237.
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adopted by New York State Club Association is that it is incon-
sistent with prior case law involving the freedom of speech for
commercial entities. In First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,307
the Court held that a commercial entity is entitled to first
amendment protections of speech when it engages in noncom-
mercial speech.308 If this same standard is applied to the right of
association, then a club may still be able to exclude women in
settings that do not deal directly with day-to-day commercial
activity.
For example, the prestigious Bohemian Club in San Fran-
cisco has an annual event called the summer encampment." 9
This event is well attended by the powerful and affluent. In
1981, the guest list included the president of Union Oil, an out-
going CIA director, and finally, the former Atomic Energy Com-
mission chairman, who in 1981 was the chancellor of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley.310 Bohemian Club members could
assert that this two-week powwow is nothing more than a chance
to experience "brotherly affection of men for each other, in the
style of the old West - men sitting around a fire in rough
clothes in the cold night, under the trees, talking, drinking
booze, listening to improvised music-such affection eludes defi-
nition."3 ' Under present case law, women might be excluded
from this encampment since it is a noncommercial expression
from a commercial entity.
In addition, the confusing result of New York State Club
Association gives little guidance to lower courts and local legisla-
tures as to how far they can go to restrict the right of associa-
tion. The decision may give these law making bodies too much
ammunition. For example, if the organization claiming a free-
dom of association is highly selective and secretive in its deal-
ings, the courts may seek to bring it within the ambit of the
307. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (overturning a Massachusetts law which prohibited corpo-
rate expenditures for the purpose of endorsing citizens to vote on certain referenda).
308. Id. at 784-85.
309. See Burns, supra note 28, at 337 (stating that "no other single event brings
together our nation's ruling class as does the Bohemian Club's summer encampment").
310. See id. at 341 (citing Bohemian Club History, Constitution and By-Laws,
House Rules, Grove Rules, Guidelines for Sponsors 9 (1980)).
311. See id. at 341 (quoting Bohemian Club History, Constitution and By-Laws,
House Rules, Grove Rules, Guidelines for Sponsors 9 (1980)).
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public accommodations laws through a commercial analysis.
Similarly, an organization whose membership criteria actively
expresses some form of political speech, may be held to be com-
mercial and entitled to no constitutional protection of speech or
association. Conversely, an organization that is non-profit and
private but whose main purpose is to engage in political speech
can be held to be private and entitled to first amendment pro-
tection, even though its discriminatory policies do not further or
enhance their political, social, or economic viewpoints."'
One can sympathize with the awkward position the Court is
in, and its reluctance to formulate any per se guidelines on the
right of association. In the past, the Court has held up the right
of association as vital to a free society. 13 Compromising this
right means the possible dilution of enumerated first amend-
ment rights."1 4 Yet, the battle against invidious discrimination
has been a principal priority of the judiciary."1 5 To hold the
state interest in battling invidious discrimination as less compel-
ling than associational interests, morally legitimizes and encour-
ages discrimination.
312. See Marshall, Discrimination and the Rights of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REV.
68, 79 (1986) ("Presumably, a noncommercial advocacy organization such as 'Save the
Whales' would, under [either Justice Brennan's public/private approach or Justice
O'Connor's commercial/expressive approach] . . . be entitled to exclude ... females even
though the exclusion has nothing to do with the positions that the organization
maintains.").
313. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; see also, A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 491 (G. Lawrence, ed. 1966) (de Toqueville states that no coun-
try but America "makes use of an unlimited freedom of.. . association").
314. See Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (holding that the right to engage in first
amendment activity necessarily implies the right of association in furtherance of those
activities); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (Effective
advocacy of speech under the first amendment is "undeniably enhanced by group
association.").
315. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (In the interest
of remedying years of outright and invidious discrimination, a program of admission to
institutions of higher education that allows admissions officers to consider race as an
affirmative factor without using clear racial quotas will be held constitutional.); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (recognizing that women have had a history of
sexual discrimination and that over the past decade the Court and Congress have be-
come more sensitive to sex-based classifications). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (a),(b),(c)
(1982) (federal civil rights statute which expressly declares that no employer, union, or
other organization shall discriminate against an individual on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
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V. Conclusion
After New York State Club Association, an individual or
organization that wishes to determine the parameters of its asso-
ciational right has no clear guidelines to follow and will have to
consult several different lines of reasoning and criteria. The
Court's failure to clarify guidelines could put the rights of asso-
ciation in far more jeopardy, in the long term, than its short
term decision to open up private men's-clubs. When one consid-
ers the integral relationship the right of association has with
first amendment freedoms and fundamental liberties,31 the
need for some consistent guidelines becomes clear. If the right of
association enhances the exercise of first amendment rights, un-
certainty as to the extent of the right of association can work to
suppress the exercise of enumerated and guaranteed liberties.
Katherine E. Speyer
316. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 629 (right of association is necessary means to act as a
buffer between the preservation of intimate and private relationships and interference by
the state); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (the right of association is a necessary
component of political expression); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (first amendment rights of petition and assembly
necessarily include the right to associate and consult with others concerning these
rights); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (first amendment
freedom of speech is undeniably enhanced by the right of association).
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